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Common Sense and Civic Virtue
Common sense is not so common.
—Voltaire, 1764
The ultimate fiduciary failure with respect to the Enron collapse was shareholder inactiv-
ity. Shareholders were responsible for the board. In the United States today, voting
control of virtually all publicly traded companies rests in trustees, the scope of whose
responsibilities can be defined under existing federal law.
—Robert A.G. Monks, 2003
This too shall pass” was my late mother’s mantra, a Buddhist phrase that      always provided comfort while facing forces beyond our control. No slouch
she, though: as a politician’s wife (Dad was mayor of Lansing, Michigan, in the





and the Democratic Ideal
Marcy Murninghan
On matters of governance, the people’s good is the highest law, as Cicero said
two millennia ago. Unfortunately, these days personal greed has trumped the
people’s good, enflaming the current governance crisis affecting our public,
nonprofit, and private spheres. The spate of corporate governance scandals
over the past several years jeopardizes equity investments, harms beneficiaries,
and weakens global capital markets. The remedy is not just more laws and regu-
lation but revitalization of the system of corporate checks and balances that
already exists. To get better corporate governance, corporate shareowners,
especially institutional investors, need to assert their rights and responsibilities
more forcefully and wisely. Doing this involves better fiduciary leadership and
governance, with the establishment of a fiduciary creed. This creed sets forth
ethical stewardship beliefs, principles, and standards, thus enabling sound pro-
cedures and competence for discharging the fiduciary role. It does so in a man-
ner that serves beneficiaries by balancing long-term financial prosperity with
institutional mission and the public interest, rightly understood. Improving the
governance and operation of institutional investors through better integration
of their ideals and principles into their investment policies, along with greater
levels of participation, representation, and accountability — exemplified by The
Boston Foundation and recently proposed legislation affecting the $28 billion
Massachusetts state pension funds — will put wasted assets to work, deter future
abuse, and restore integrity and trust in equity culture. The author calls this
“civic stewardship.”
Marcy Murninghan is founder of The Lighthouse Investment Group and has worked as a con-
sultant, educator, activist, and writer on issues involving “money and morality” since 1983.
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loss, you could mourn while still working to make things better. Letting things
“pass” did not mean being “passive,” and if you tried to do the right thing while
minding your manners, your politics, and your reputation, things eventually would
get better.
This advice could be applied to current events, as we confront a crisis of gover-
nance and an assault on the democratic ideal affecting our public, nonprofit, and
private spheres. In electoral politics, our belief in representative democracy was
challenged by the uncertainty and turbulence over the results of the 2000 U.S.
Presidential campaign, with a Supreme Court overriding American voters too many
of whom stayed home on Election Day. Declining voter participation, the predomi-
nance of special interests and Big Money in political campaigns and government
decision making, and — in a more disturbing development — the use of recall
petitions to undo the will of the people, as is the case this October 7th with the
recall election of California’s governor, are ominous signs that weaken representa-
tive democracy.
But good governance is not just a government matter, or one restricted to
business corporations; it is essential to nonprofit organizations, too. Closer to home
— and thanks to the Pulitzer Prize-winning work of the Boston Globe and the
prosecutorial courage of Massachusetts attorney general Thomas F. Reilly —
scandals within the Catholic Church remind us that accountability, honesty, and
fidelity to core mission are not flimsy items that can be swept under rugs or robes
in the name of the good. American cardinals seem to “have made a hymnal out of
the Enron playbook,” as New York Times columnist Frank Rich put it earlier this
year.1  Secular charities, too, seem to have forgotten that governance counts, as
scandals affecting nonprofits such as the American Red Cross, Nature Conservancy,
and United Way continue to surface, calling into question not only their good
manners and altruistic acumen but also their commitment and accountability to
fiduciary and public interest obligations.2  Mounting calls for greater accountability
from nonprofit groups throw a needed spotlight on the governance and operations
of charitable organizations, particularly their oversight duties, fundraising and
administrative costs, sources of financing, accounting practices, and other opera-
tional information.
But the transgressions of nonprofit organizations pale when compared to the very
bad manners and behavior of big business, whose culpability in bad governance is
exceeded only by the passivity of those who gained from it. The parade of Enron,
WorldCom/MCI, Adelphia, Tyco, Global Crossing, and numerous other perpetrators
of corporate wrongdoing remind us that the marketplace sometimes undermines the
very virtues and values it is supposed to uphold. We are reminded, too, that not
everything can be bought and sold, that intangible goods such as honor, trust,
honesty, and integrity are the connective tissue that holds the body politic — and
capital markets, equity culture, and civil society — together. Yet equity culture has
been hijacked by those who have scorned these intangible goods, violated their
fiduciary duties, made a mockery of our financial system, and, in the process,
inflicted damage on countless investors and innocent bystanders.
Capital Crime and Punishment
“It’s Dickensonian,” says corporate governance guru Robert A.G. Monks, whose
work over the past 20 years is widely credited with spawning current reform
efforts, including the January 2003 decision by the Securities and Exchange
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Commission mandating disclosure of proxy voting policies and records by mutual
fund managers and investment advisers. (The Economist recently dubbed him
perhaps America’s most distinguished corporate governance activist.) “It’s the best
of times and the worst of times, because we live in the failure of institutional
activism. The smoking gun is not so much the WorldCom, Tyco, Enron — you
name it. The smoking gun is the unrestrained pattern of chief executive self-
compensation.
This is a reality. The theoretical progress that we felt we’d been making over ten or
fifteen years was very rudely confronted by the reality that when there was an issue
that was very important to top management, like how much they got paid, they were
absolutely unconstrained. That power remains in the hands of the CEOs and they’ve
abused that power. And the institutions have found it convenient not to involve
themselves. Another piece of the ‘worst times’ paragon is that if you look to leadership
among institutions in America in 2003 you see fewer names than you saw ten or
fifteen years ago, and they’re the same names.
The best of news is that not only has the obligation of ERISA [private corporate
pension] plans to intervene been confirmed, but the SEC has taken that position with
respect to all of the 1940 Act fiduciaries — investment advisers and investment
companies — and the bank regulators have said that they are going to pass comparable
rules for bank trusts. That was devotedly wished by me 15 years ago, that the 50
percent of voting stock of all American corporations represented by trustees, the scope
of whose obligations are determined by federal law, would come to pass. But with that
and a dime we can make a phone call is the other side of the question.3
Most people are outraged by these abuses, by these insults to our American
notion of the democratic ideal, but they adopt Mom’s mantra of “This, too, shall
pass” without also examining her silent coda: Don’t just sit there, DO something!
Do it well, and do it with the courage of your convictions… All too often they leave
the job of mopping up the mess to lawyers, elected officials, and regulators, who,
under the white-hot glare of the media spotlight, scramble to litigate, hold hearings,
pass laws, and cobble together regulations that will restore confidence and trust.
Big business is a great target, because Americans always have been suspicious of
vast concentrations of wealth and power — and with the “Wall Street Walk” now
overshadowed by the “CEO Perp Walk,” there is plenty of reason to be.4
The result is a litany of litigation, legal settlements, and formal measures
designed to correct or constrain the darker side of human nature. In fact, Monks’s
latest stab at corporate accountability — he spends a good deal of time in the
United Kingdom, where shareholder rights are taken far more seriously, buttressed
by English law and government policy — involves the use of shareholder class
action suits to force changes in top management and director ranks. He has teamed
up with Bill Lerach, a partner at one of the world’s most formidable plaintiff law
firms, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach. Milberg Weiss specializes in
securities suits and has successfully negotiated settlements for hundreds of millions
of dollars with companies such as 3Com, Rite Aid, Sunbeam, and MicroStrategy.
The firm currently is representing the lead plaintiff in the shareholder suit against
Enron (the University of California, which wants its money back.) Lerach wants to
change the way Wall Street investment banks underwrite securities by eliminating
indemnity agreements that exempt them from liability. Nicknamed “the king of
pain,” Lerach is legendary for his casual, flamboyant, tough talking approach; the
pair is well matched in what easily could be called the battlefield of the titans.5
New England Journal of Public Policy
86
Litigation aside, Monks has a bigger idea for assuring corporate accountability,
which strikes at the heart of who governs. “The corporation code of the United
Kingdom and such other Anglophone jurisdictions as Bermuda and Canada is
simply this,” Monks said in an interview. “Ten percent of shareholders may as a
matter of right call a meeting of shareholders, at which meeting a majority may
replace any or all of the directors with or without cause.”6
Director removal by majority vote? Similar to California’s recall election
(“Recall of the Wild,” as William Safire put it), that is a terrible swift sword in
democracy’s arsenal. While this method may square well within a parliamentary
democracy, where snap elections are called to bring the ship of state back on
course, such a Draconian approach to good governance is not appropriate in
American waters (or boardrooms) unless terribly egregious behavior has occurred.
Indeed, one is hard pressed to consider how a parliamentary system of corporate
governance would work within an American constitutional system of representative
democracy. Democracy by plebiscite is not a good idea, particularly in an era of
short attention spans and complete media saturation of the public sphere, which
cripples public discourse and amplifies the power of even the most marginal groups
to extraordinary and undeserved (some would say fictional) levels. In a wired
world, there are few filters for sifting through the claims of crackpots and those
having more thoughtful, nuanced views.
The more compelling truth is, we have not even begun to look at ways in which
shareholders might use our constitutional brand of governance to their advantage,
through the use of proxy elections, shareholder conventions, platforms, shareholder
/ voter education, and so on. Furthermore, since most of the time proxy voting is a
non-binding referendum, whether or not it is the final answer to governance
failures remains to be seen. No government can be run on the basis of referenda or
plebiscite, and even with high votes, the full ramifications and opportunities
presented by the proxy franchise have yet to be considered.
Proxy voting is a vehicle for shareholders to have their say; whether or not
boards and managers are listening is discretionary, not obligatory.7 This is a fact
that has gone unnoticed until recently, except for those seasoned in the politics of
corporate governance. “In recent years we have noticed a trend of majority votes on
corporate governance proposals,” noted Kenneth B. Sylvester in an interview held
in May 2002. “This has become the real issue because despite the majority votes on
these proposals, we find that the boards of these companies have decided not to
adopt them.”
Sylvester is assistant comptroller for pension policy in the New York City
comptroller’s office, and responsible for developing, researching, recommending,
and overseeing proxy programs and policies. The NYC comptroller is the invest-
ment adviser to and custodian of New York City’s five major public pension funds,
which currently have combined assets of $69.2 billion. Sylvester, who has been
with the comptroller’s office for roughly 20 years, advises the proxy committee of
each fund (which are for city employees, teachers, police, fire, and the board of
education) and, working with them, initiates and, where the portfolio company is
willing, engages in active dialogue with senior corporate executives.
In a game plan followed by most other shareholder activists, in those instances
where dialogue has not produced results acceptable to the NYC retirement systems,
proxy proposals are then submitted on their behalf for the company’s shareholders
to consider and vote at the firm’s annual meeting. The NYC 2002-03 proxy
programs included five proposals on corporate governance reforms (one or more of
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these were submitted to 25 companies) and eight proposals on corporate social
responsibility reforms (one or more of these were submitted to 45 companies). A
number of the NYC social responsibility proposals were co-sponsored by other
institutional investors and human rights organizations, including the New York State
Common Retirement Fund, the Minnesota Board of Investments, the Connecticut
Retirement Plans, and pension funds of religious organizations and churches
affiliated with the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (“ICCR”), Trillium
Asset Management, Amnesty International, Human Rights Campaign, and Walden
Asset Management.
“They’re not abiding by the majority vote of the shareholders,” Sylvester says.
“This is an issue of concern, not just in New York City, but also to institutional
investors generally. It’s something that’s on the front burner. What’s the next step?
Where do we go from here? Where do the shareholders go after we see the majority
votes? Not just one year, two years, three years. What do you do next?
I think what you might see happening in the future is the proxy contest where
institutional investors may be coming together to run a short slate of directors to
replace management’s elected nominees. An intermediate step is to try and get
independent directors to be more responsive to shareholders. While institutional
investors focus on the idea of independent directors, I think it’s a matter of form
without substance, because despite all these majority votes, there’s no communication
between the so-called independent directors and the shareholders.
I think there ought to be some type of system put in place, some type of process or
procedure whereby independent directors in particular are required to communicate or
provide for communication between shareholders and themselves. Currently, if you try
to reach out to a director of a company, there’s always an intervention by management,
usually the investor relations office or the general counsel. There’s always that wall
that tends to insulate or hide the director from the shareholders who actually elect
them. I think it’s a situation that has to be addressed…
The whole concept of independent directors rings pretty hollow to me if there is no
real way for expressing your concerns and having them respond to them, or even
having them understand the issues better and advocate on your behalf.
The one opportunity that shareholders have to actually meet with management is
the annual meeting. Even at those meetings there’s no communication between
directors and shareholders. The CEO, or whoever is chairing that meeting, really
controls all communications. If a shareholder stands up and asks a question of a
director, you might find that the CEO might determine whether or not the director
should answer the question, or what the answer should be. So I just think the situation
has to be addressed. I think it’s the next step. Perhaps it’s the next step before
shareholders begin to wage those proxy battles, or place dissident nominees on the
board.
This is an emerging issue, if you will. The phenomenon of majority votes is
something that began happening [since about 1994], when we started to see significant
votes on issues….If you’re going to talk about corporate democracy in relation to
good governance based on a political system like the United States, then it really is a
travesty.8
Sylvester’s observations, made 17 months ago, were prescient, and have momen-
tous implications. Put simply, amidst all the buzz on corporate governance and
shareholder activism, we have seen no serious discussion of a mode of fiduciary
governance that corresponds to our constitutional system of political governance,
with its checks and balances on power and authority and enshrinement of demo-
cratic ideals. The whole idea of American governance is self-governance, and in
order to get it you must have accountability, representation, and participation.
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These are the three procedural pillars on which our democratic system rests, and as
we have seen, are crumbling, at best, in our corporate capital system.
What Ken Sylvester is saying is that the growing levels of shareholder activism
and engagement in corporate governance matters do not result in reform. Just as
investors are getting used to the power of their vote, they are discovering that in
reality their vote does not really count for much at all, other than an expression of
sentiment.
An analogy in electoral politics might go something like this: a municipality
holds an election for city council, but voters are unable to speak with councilors
after they are elected without first going through (or around) the mayor and city
attorney.
Another spin on this scenario is: a municipality holds an election for city
council, but only a handful of wards and precincts post any returns; most people
fail to vote. A minority of registered voters who live in certain neighborhoods
elects the winners, who are expected to serve everyone.
Indeed, perhaps the most insidious version of our urban electoral analogue to the
way things are done in corporate governance elections is this: a municipality holds
an election for city council, but the only candidates allowed on the ballot are those
who were nominated by the mayor, council, and top city officials. There is no
primary race. The election is held, with only a tiny percentage of voters turning
out. After the election, none of the city’s residents are able to confer with their duly
elected councilors without first encountering the mayor and city attorney, who
serve as gatekeepers.
This would never be acceptable in our electoral politics, but this is prevailing
practice in corporate governance elections; like Santa Claus, there is really no such
thing as corporate democracy, even though that was the way the American corporate
governance system was supposed to operate.
Nevertheless, institutional investors offer a ray of hope in the midst of all of this
bad governance, in part because a few of them have racked up years of experience
and savvy — financial, policy, and political — to reverse the tide of decline. As
owners, by law they are able to behave like citizens who possess the franchise;
federal legislation, court settlements, and several current SEC proposals are aimed
at bringing this shareholder citizen role more into alignment with how the nation’s
roughly 15,000 publicly traded companies are governed and managed.
One in particular holds the promise of helping to make companies more demo-
cratically accountable to shareholders. In July 2003, the SEC issued a staff report
prepared by its Division of Corporate Finance in response to mounting calls for a
greater shareholder voice in corporate boardrooms. The report also was a follow up
to an announcement made in April that the SEC was going to review existing proxy
rules and regulations; public views were solicited, yielding commentary from 690
individuals and groups. The vast majority of respondents, which included union
leaders, pension fund managers, and large institutional investors, supported modify-
ing the proxy rules and regulations with respect to the nomination and election of
directors; opponents included all of the corporations and corporate executives who
responded, as well as most of the legal community and business associations.
The suggested new rules contained in the resulting staff report slightly open up
the process of director nomination and election; under existing practice, corporate
boards nominate themselves for reelection. If they wish, shareholders may withhold
votes from a candidate — they cannot vote against a nominee — but if they do, the
outcome is still guaranteed because no write-in votes are allowed. Directors are
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elected by plurality voting; only those nominees appearing on the ballot are elected,
even if there are few votes to count. Should shareholders wants to run for office, a
full-scale (and extremely costly) proxy fight is required, because shareholders are
not allowed to nominate board candidates appearing on the management ballots sent
out to shareholders prior to the company’s annual meeting.
The suggested new rules — which by late July had not yet been developed into
final proposals and issued for public comment — would change this, and make
some provision for “eligible shareholders” to run minority seats on the board of
directors; the “appropriate eligibility threshold” pertains to share ownership per-
centages, and at this writing has not yet been set. (Nor had the possibility of
multiple shareholder nominees.) Certain “triggering events” would have to occur,
however, for the proxy process to be opened to shareholder nominees. Although the
details of triggering events were still being worked out, they would serve as
objective criteria that demonstrate deficiencies in the proxy process, which prevent
shareholder views from being taken into account adequately. The staff report
describes them thusly:
Triggering events could include a company’s failure to act on shareholder proposals
that receive majority votes or the receipt of significant percentages of “withhold” votes
in director elections. Another triggering event could be approval of a shareholder
proposal to activate the shareholder access rule. Though other triggering events could
be used, including economic performance, e.g., lagging a peer index for a specified
number of consecutive years, the Division is of the view that any triggering event
should be more closely tied to evidence of ineffectiveness in the proxy process.9
In spite of these moves, Bob Monks remains pessimistic about authentic gover-
nance reform in the United States because, prior to the SEC decision made earlier
this year requiring mutual funds and financial advisers to vote, the vast majority of
institutional shareholders have chosen not to get involved. He points to the disap-
pointing performance of ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974) funds, an area he knows well because he served as the Department of Labor’s
ERISA administrator for three years during the Reagan administration. (ERISA
funds are corporate-sponsored pension funds, and are required to vote their prox-
ies.)  During Monks’s tenure he began pressing his agenda that stock ownership is a
responsibility and not simply a property right.
“The golden rule that has resulted is there has been no instance in the last thirty
years since the passage of ERISA of a private company pension plan being involved
with activism and, horribly enough, not a single instance of the Department of
Labor bringing an enforcement action to compel them to be,” he says. But ERISA
funds are not the only institutional investors he blames. “The most disappointing
quiescent shareholders are the foundations and the universities,” he says, going on
to describe what you could call “soft” conflicts of interest produced by their
reliance on major donors, which puts them in the uncomfortable position of not
wanting to monitor (or bite) the hand that feeds them.
What Monks considers the “virtual failure of all parties who ought to be able to
perform the monitoring function” leads him to conclude that litigation is the only
fruitful course of action. “I decided that I would affiliate myself with a shareholder
plaintiff law firm,” he says, “and attempt to use the leverage of settlements as a way
of forcing governance to change …
[Milberg Weiss has] a whole roster of cases where they’ve brought shareholder suits
that have gotten to the point of discussing settlement with the companies and rather
New England Journal of Public Policy
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than just going for damages, which is the corporation writing a check, we are asking
the corporations to change their governance. That way the ongoing company is more
valuable than the one against whom we got the judgment. It’s a big risk whether or not
it’s going to work, but I felt I had to take my own energy in the next five-year plan and
work on the problem from a perspective that had a little more promise.10
While it may be too soon to tell if Robert Monks’s litigious strategy is the best
way to improve corporate governance, he has met with some success, citing
February’s ouster of Sprint chairman and CEO William Esrey and Sprint president
and chief operating officer Ronald LeMay over their use of controversial tax
shelters as an auspicious start. “We got lucky,” he told The Economist, conceding
that the Sprint board had already decided to remove the two officers.
Since then, Monks and Lerach have negotiated some fifty corporate governance
improvements at Sprint as an alternative to full-blown litigation; Lerach has
referred to this as “corporate governance at the point of a gun.”11 Prior to their
intervention, Sprint’s board was ranked by The Corporate Library (“TCL”), a
corporate governance research and monitoring group founded by Monks and
longtime partner Nell Minow in 1999, as one of the worst in the country; the
company still has room for further improvements, she said in an email.12
Minow is in a good position to know about corporate governance matters
because she is one of the founders of governance reform and has spent years
cultivating her craft; she is widely quoted in mainstream media outlets for her pithy
analyses and fair approach. In addition to advocacy, Nell Minow takes seriously the
need to educate the public because without an informed citizenry, democracy
shrivels up and dies.
In June 2003, The Corporate Library released its latest governance survey of
1,700 companies, which examined board effectiveness. The Board Effectiveness
Ratings (“BER”) provide a tool for measuring investment risk, and rely on a rating
formula that grades companies on an A through F scale. Among the measures used
to determine governance effectiveness are executive compensation, board composi-
tion, characteristics of certain special peer groupings (such as controlled, family, or
stakeholder boards), and shareholder accountability. The latter is exemplified by
“appropriate and effective representation of shareholder interest,” Minow says,
rather than by broader buzzwords of independence and compliance, which may not
take into account clearly articulated shareholder preferences.
“Look at the Maytag board,” she explains. “They rate quite high according to the
typical ‘best practice’ benchmarks, including director independence. But for three
years running they have refused to enact shareholder proposals that were approved
by a majority vote. What clearer demonstration of a board’s failure to understand
their obligation to shareholders can you get?”13
Good Intentions Randomize Behavior
Bob Monks’s skepticism regarding genuine governance reform may be justified, but
it overlooks one of the lessons of history, which is that remedial action — forced or
voluntary — often gives rise to new problems sometimes more stubborn or intrac-
table than their predecessor. Grand or modest, most remedies and reforms are
accompanied by new expectations, rules, structures, and procedures that over time
may quickly become irrelevant or — as in the case of stock options — may exacer-
bate the problems they were originally designed to address.14
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For example, the original thinking throughout the 1990s regarding the now-
sullied stock options was that they would serve as incentives for top executives to
improve corporate earnings; this has, of course, backfired, as managers continued
to reap hefty bonuses and option plans, regardless of poor performance. Activists
took notice, and pressured companies to list these options as expenses on the
corporate balance sheet; companies had not been doing so, which gave shareholders
an artificially inflated sense of corporate earnings and the true value of their shares.
Moreover, the outrages over executive compensation — which were boosted
primarily by sizable options packages — further fanned the flames. This past July,
the SEC decided to require shareholder approval for equity compensation plans,
which include options.
Around the same time, Microsoft made big news with its July 8th decision to
stop dispensing stock options to its 50,000 employees. Microsoft announced that
now it will issue restricted stock, which vests over a five-year period, as a better
form of compensation. Yet Microsoft’s decision also presents a way out for the
company, which, if it expensed the 1.6 billion options outstanding, would have
sizably fewer earnings to report. Other companies are expected to follow suit, and
exchange options plans for another form of equity compensation.
The idea of using stock options as an incentive for executives was first suggested
in the 1970s by Michael C. Jensen of the Harvard Business School and William
Meckling at the University of Rochester. Their paper, “Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” stressed the importance
of aligning management’s interests with shareholders, which in the modern corpora-
tion had become more fragmented and dispersed. While the idea remains sound —
after all, managers and shareholders share a desire to see a company’s share price
appreciate by more than the cost of capital — its success is more likely if share-
holders pay closer attention to what management is doing, thereby reducing the
opportunity for abuse.
Speaking at a recent annual conference sponsored by the Coalition for Environ-
mentally Responsible Economics (“CERES”), Marina Whitman, a business profes-
sor at the University of Michigan and former chief economist of General Motors
who also serves on a number of corporate boards, said, “Years ago, one of my
books recommended the use of stock options, but we never dreamed that they
would be abused.”15
Good intentions randomize behavior, as eminent urbanist and former UMass
president Bob Wood always used to say. One wonders how Bob’s bromide applies
to annual board elections, which are so strongly favored by corporate governance
reformists. What are they thinking? In electoral politics, annual or biannual elec-
tions do little to invite long-range strategic thinking in the interests of both local
constituents and the public interest; instead, they reinforce a short-term, risk-averse
preoccupation with getting reelected. Even with biannual elections — even qua-
drennial, if you look at our presidential politics — there exists a strong temptation
to slide into a permanent campaign, and as most of us know, there is a big differ-
ence between getting elected and governing. As the corporate governance process
opens up and greater shareholder involvement with nominating and electing board
members becomes the norm, short terms of service may undermine the very
fiduciary stewardship ethic reformists intended to install.
Other unattractive features of electoral politics — such as the dominance of
special interest groups, professional electoral consultants, excessive campaign
contributions, and so on  — could easily follow unless carefully thought out
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principles and guidelines for civic stewardship — combining representative democ-
racy and wise statecraft — prevail. Good governance, after all, is not just about
structure and strategy, but also about soul and substance. The ancients called this
“civic virtue.”
Already there are signs of the triumph of consultants’ power over elections, with
a virtual monopoly on the proxy process held by a handful of players (most
notably, Institutional Shareholder Services, co-founded 18 years ago by Bob Monks
and Nell Minow, and the Investor Responsibility Research Center, founded in
1972). Most institutional investors lack a built-in mechanism for handling proxy
voting, and therefore rely heavily on the recommendations — however well
researched and formulated — of others. Proxy advisory services and information
provided by advocates of certain proxy issues can play an important role in helping
shareholders, but the full impact of their influence on institutional investor voting
remains unclear. The orientation and credentials of these proxy advisers and
advocates are never debated, mainly due to their small numbers and relatively
limited track records. Even as reputable an institution as the IRRC does not reveal
much about its methods, staff, or membership; known for its objectivity and
in-depth reporting, it would do well to disclose more about its operations to
nonsubscribers.
Besides the problem of monopoly, there are two other related problems with
existing proxy advisory service offerings, as well as proxy pressures made on
companies by advocates. First, proxy recommendations and vote solicitation are
often made without any transparency, accountability, or supporting evidence. In
general, positions are defined and advanced, with very little research rationale to
back them up. (A notable exception is the work of the Global Reporting Initiative
and CERES, which has methodically laid an empirical foundation for linking
corporate governance to environmental sustainability.) There is scant information as
to the background, qualifications, and experience of those consultants who advise
investor clients; in general, they come from the securities industry, and have little
knowledge of or experience with public policy and organizational administration.
Second, proxy advisory services are usually rendered without practical knowl-
edge of the organizational requirements for implementation and evaluation. In
addition to proxy advisers, shareholders are likely to be bombarded by proponents
for a particular cause on proxy issues, whose ideological views may interfere with
good decision making. You cannot ask an organization or bureaucracy to do
something without a sense of its capacity to deliver. The problems of implementa-
tion, we have learned over and over again in the public and nonprofit sectors, often
derail even the most well articulated social policy possessing broad-based political
or donor support. There is no reason to presume a similar fate regarding proxy
resolutions — even if boards did adopt them.
In addition to the absence of educational and training programs, I often have
wondered why there are so few organizational specialists or policy experts among
the legions of socially responsible investing professionals or corporate governance
activists, and so little focus on organizational development and implementation, or
the broader policy context, at their conferences and gatherings. You cannot have
governance reform without institutional reform, and you cannot push a social
policy agenda without understanding the broader issues involved, but practitioners
in these areas seem to occupy multiple parallel universes.
Some — most notably Steve Lydenberg, one of the most experienced and
thoughtful practitioners in the social investing field, and Monks and Minow, with
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their establishment of The Corporate Library and continued public service work
— have spoken out on the need for expanded and higher quality educational
offerings in the realms of business ethics, socially responsible investing, corporate
governance, and corporate responsibility. The time is long overdue for profes-
sional development in the duties of both governance and ownership. This is an
ironic state of affairs for those board members, social investors, and governance
activists who otherwise claim to be acting in the best interest of shareholders.
Nevertheless, corporate governance reform related initiatives continue to appear
at a brisk pace, producing what some have dubbed “corporate governance fatigue.”
Business ethics consultants are once again in great demand, business schools are
scrambling to offer courses and executive training sessions on ethics, corporate
social responsibility, and corporate governance, and monographs and dissertations
on ethical corporate behavior churn out at a furious pace. (In fact, according to
Business Ethics magazine, California state senator Richard Alarcon has filed a bill
that would requires business students, both undergraduate and graduate, attending
California public colleges and universities to take ethics courses. California Senate
Bill 821 would also create a state ethics commission.)16
When it comes to corporate governance, what we have is a new line of business
opportunities. A cottage industry of corporate governance and monitoring experts
has mushroomed, lucrative board advisory and ratings services have blossomed,
database giants and technology consulting firms (which hawk automated tools and
advice for handling the new transparency data demands) have enjoyed new life
after the dot-com meltdown, and a number of specialty books have been pub-
lished, providing insiders’ views as to why things happened as they did, and what
should be done about it.17
Aside from the money spent on records management and business process
management, you have to wonder if all of this activity will really make a differ-
ence, and if it is necessary to pay large amounts of money to people to teach and
advise what ought to be just plain common sense. Plus, there are no ways of
screening so-called experts (many of whom are public relations experts, manage-
ment consultants, and investment bankers), and whether or not their experience
will help to improve corporate governance and operations. Most of the consulting
fees — estimated to reach $2.5 billion this year — will be spent on regulatory
compliance, rather than a genuine commitment to upgrade shareholder, board, and
management knowledge, competence, and behavior, or developing new gover-
nance models that integrate democratic ideals while remaining true to core mis-
sion. A notable exception among the legions of advisers is McKinsey & Company,
which has conducted solid corporate governance work for the past 10 years and
recognizes that good corporate governance involves every element in the organiza-
tional system. Since 2000, McKinsey survey research has shown that a significant
majority of institutional shareholders will pay a premium for well-governed
companies, and that corporate governance now lies at the heart of investment
decisions.
“Everybody knows what they are supposed to do and they should just go do it,”
says Ira Millstein, attorney and prominent corporate governance specialist, refer-
ring to board responsibilities and the boom in governance consulting. “This is not
tough stuff, this is not rocket science. The only technical piece of this is the audit
committee ... The rest of it is just plain common sense, knowing the business,
going to meetings, not falling asleep, paying attention and keeping your eyes on
the CEO.”18
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The Need for a Fiduciary Creed
These governance educational and consulting services stem primarily from two
legal and regulatory developments over the past 18 months that shook the founda-
tion of capital markets and imposed sweeping new requirements. They serve as twin
beacons — one initiated by state prosecutors and culminating in an eventual
settlement, the other by congressmen eager to take a stand against investor losses
caused by financial fraud — for somewhat better days ahead. The stock exchanges
also proposed new listing standards and rules, particularly with respect to director
independence and reporting. Even if human nature dictates that there will always be
crooks and corporate scandals, thanks to last April’s $1.4 billion settlement affect-
ing ten Wall Street investment banks and last year’s Congressional passage of the
antifraud Sarbanes-Oxley Act the crooks will find the going’s gotten a bit tougher,
with the Federal government paying closer attention and with sanctions more
severe.
These actions, however laudable, are not enough, because a host of critical
questions remain unanswered. Most of them relate to the investor part of the
investor/corporate equation. After all, companies are not untethered from those
whose money was put at risk to finance them. Still absent is a fiduciary creed that
articulates a set of beliefs and principles about the moral obligations of equity
ownership.
A sampler: Will these any of these actions succeed in restoring investor confi-
dence and trust in our economic systems? Will they succeed in installing and
sustaining responsible ownership and fiduciary governance regimes that assure such
corporate perversions do not happen again? Will they succeed in assuring the
minimum fiduciary and legal obligation to achieve the greatest possible asset value,
through a trustee ethic of duty, care, and consistency? Indeed, will these myriad
corporate governance reform actions succeed in assuring not merely the minimum
fiduciary and legal standard, but one that surpasses it, exploiting investment assets
to their fullest and embracing the normative realm of ethical principles and values
consistent with our democratic tradition?
More importantly, do these actions acknowledge the explosive growth in institu-
tional stock ownership — including mutual funds, pension funds, insurance compa-
nies, and endowments — since the 1980s, which now controls almost 50 percent of
U.S. corporate equity and a sizable portion of the economy as a whole? Do these
actions address, because of their enormous size and potential power, the construc-
tive role these institutional investors can play to influence corporate accountability
to fiduciary standards, and incorporate ethical and civic moral values in doing so?
In addition to corporate governance, do these reforms recognize the constructive
role these institutional investors can play to influence the broader economic environ-
ment, and how their decisions impact whole industries — perhaps even world
politics and economic development? Beyond monitoring, do these reforms address
the constructive leadership role these institutional investors can play to set a positive
agenda for corporations and industries on important matters of mutual interest,
consistent with the fiduciary ethic and our democratic ideals?
Indeed, do these actions help us understand what constitutes good fiduciary
governance — including the use of otherwise “wasted assets,” such as the proxy
vote and whether or not investor boards of directors are displaying it? Do they
acknowledge the growing intensity and clout of investors on corporate behavior —
particularly with regard to CEO pay and global warming — as expressed through
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filing and voting shareholder resolutions? Do they provide guidance as to what
companies should do when resolutions receive high percentages of “yes” votes,
when the company tradition is to ignore them? As already mentioned, as it now
stands, companies do not have to do anything, although suggestions contained in a
staff report issued by the SEC in mid-July would give shareholders greater power
to nominate and elect corporate directors in the event the board ignores shareholder
preferences.
In fact, this year was a banner year for proxy voting, with more than 1,040
resolutions filed — a 20 percent increase, according to the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (“IRRC”), over last year’s total of 802. The gain was particularly
dramatic for corporate governance resolutions, particularly those related to execu-
tive compensation (325 in 2003, up from 106 in 2002), separation of the roles of
chairman and CEO (27 filed in 2003, compared to 4 in 2002), and offshore tax
havens (a new issue on the proxy docket, submitted by labor related funds and
directed to Carnival, Cooper Industries Ltd., Ingersoll-Rand, McDermott Interna-
tional, Schlumberger Ltd., Transocean, and Tyco International).
Shareholder resolutions also were filed on various social policy and environmen-
tal issues; roughly 238 were filed this season, a slight increase over the number
filed last year. Topping the list was global warming; led by a coalition of environ-
mental, religious, and pension funds, 31 global warming resolutions were filed with
23 U.S. and 5 Canadian companies this year, including those in the automobile,
electric power, and oil industries. Others included sexual orientation anti-bias
policies (19 filed in 2002, more than the nine filed in 2002), fair employment
policies, and reporting on greenhouse gas emissions. Several websites provide up-
to-date information on the status of shareholder resolutions, including The Corpo-
rate Library (www.thecorporatelibrary.com), Domini Social Investments
(www.domini.com), the Investor Responsibility Research Center (www.irrc.org),
the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (www.iccr.org), the Coalition for
Environmentally Responsive Economics (www.ceres.org), and the Shareholder
Action Network, a joint project of the Social Investment Forum and Coop America
(www.sharholderaction.org).
More than appeals to conscience, most of these proxy resolutions concerned the
potential financial risks associated with a company’s social and environmental
stance. According to Timothy Smith, one of the nation’s leading experts on corpo-
rate accountability and shareholder activism, “It is clear that 2003 will be remem-
bered as the year when investors decided to stand up and be counted, using their
voice and vote to call for strengthened corporate governance and solid corporate
citizenship. Investors are moving from passive holders of stock to becoming active
and responsible owners…understanding the leverage they have as individuals and
institutions who have invested their capital and faith in these companies.” One of
the founders of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (“ICCR”) serving
for 25 years its executive director, Smith is currently senior vice president and
director of socially responsive investing at Walden Asset Management, a Boston-
based money management firm; he also is president of the Social Investment
Forum, the national trade association for the social investment industry.19
This view on risk exposure to environmental hazards is echoed by Mindy
Lubber, executive director of CERES, who points out the overlap between the
financial and nonfinancial domains. “Climate change risk is not just an ‘environ-
mental’ issue. It is directly related to the bottom-line viability of several American
industries, including oil, utilities, and autos. In the wake of scandals at Enron and
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other corporations, investors are now wide awake to the issues of risk, and the
awareness that all too many companies are not doing enough to assess, report, and
mitigate these dangers to shareholder value. The increasing shareholder focus on
climate change issues shows how such ‘hidden risks’ can no longer be swept under
the carpet by unresponsive managers.”20
In July, CERES released a study of some of the world’s largest companies that
revealed that they are not adequately assessing, disclosing, or addressing the finan-
cial risks posed by climate change. Researchers found that the 20 companies exam-
ined in Corporate Governance and Climate Change: Making the Connection,
including ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, General Electric, Southern Company, and
Xcel Energy, “also are failing to deal with global warming issues in other key
corporate governance areas…The companies profiled in the report include the top
five carbon emitters in electric power, auto and petroleum industries as well as five
other industry leaders — all core holdings in institutional investment portfolios. A
14-point ‘Climate Change Governance Checklist’ analyzes these companies’ response
actions in the areas of board oversight, management accountability, executive
compensation, emissions reporting, and material risk disclosure.” The report was
commissioned by CERES and written by the Investor Responsibility Research
Center; a copy is available from CERES by visiting its website www.ceres.org.21
In addition to a record number of resolutions, the 2002-2003 proxy season
featured record-high votes: two corporate governance resolutions, at Avon and Baker
Hughes, received 80 percent shareholder approval. On the social and environmental
side, the average 2003 support for resolutions filed with electric utilities as well as
oil and gas companies was 22.6 percent, much higher than in previous years.22 (As
of this writing, final vote tallies for most proxy contests had yet to come in. Unlike
electoral politics, when often the outcome is known even before the polls close,
proxy campaigns remain undecided for weeks.) Even though the vast majority of
proposals are nonbinding, high voting percentages send a clear message to company
management about shareholder preferences and opinions.
Another indicator of investor power is the extent of shareholder / company
communication, demonstrated in part by the number of shareholder resolutions that
are withdrawn because of company willingness to fulfill the resolution’s request or
engage in important dialogue with shareholders. Yet when looking at the regulatory
and statutory landscape, in particular the 30 July 2002 passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the $1.4 billion Wall Street settlement, one is hard-pressed to find
references to the significant role that owners can play in improving corporate
governance and accountability. Although the idea of fiduciary leadership and
governance is hinted at (mainly concerning investor education and proxy activism),
it is vastly overshadowed by the plethora of penalties, rules, review committees, and
structural remedies.
Indeed, one should ask if these actions acknowledge the tangible implications of
fiduciary governance, including institutional investor recognition of other forms of
power at their disposal to promote corporate accountability, such as the “soft” power
of framework and agenda setting, information and expertise, dialogue, persuasion,
and formation of alliances and networks with others having shared concerns?
Do these actions facilitate better shareholder representation, consistent with our
republican tradition; for example, do they clear a path for shareholder nomination of
corporate board candidates, which in theory is how the corporate governance system
is supposed to work anyway? Some movement on this question has occurred, which
is promising. Last July the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance prepared a report
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concerning its review of current regulations regarding the nomination and election
of directors and recommended improved disclosure and improved shareholder
access to the process, which is now under consideration.
As for the shareholders themselves, do these corporate governance reform
actions promote greater trustee knowledge and competence within institutional
investor boards? Similar to the rash of corporate governance ratings services, do
they help in the formulation of a normative framework and empirical guidelines for
monitoring and comparing fiduciary boards, to identify best practices and promote
them? Do they help us define what it means to be a good investor?
Put another way, do these various corporate governance reform actions pave the
way for a creed of responsible ownership and fiduciary governance, which I call
“civic stewardship”?23
Sadly, the answer to most of these questions is a resounding No. As renowned
corporate governance expert Nell Minow has pointed out, most reform measures are
focused on the “supply” side of corporate scandals, affecting the companies them-
selves, rather than the “demand” side of equity ownership, now dominated by
institutional assets.  With two significant exceptions — last January’s SEC ruling
that mutual funds adopt and disclose proxy voting policies, the triumphant culmina-
tion of a process Minow and her longtime partner Bob Monks initiated in 1988 with
their letter to the SEC seeking these changes, and bolstered by a massive transpar-
ency campaign led by the AFL-CIO, Teamsters, and Domini Social Investments,24
and the July 2003 SEC staff report on director nomination and election — none of
these reforms focus on how investors might better exercise their rights and respon-
sibilities as owners. Even though common sense tells us they should do so, none of
these corporate governance reform measures provide a blueprint for fiduciary
governance that reinforces the system of checks and balances that already exists and
shows investors how to properly discharge their responsibilities, while reinforcing
an ethic of civic virtue and the democratic ideal. Business does not function in a
vacuum, and capital markets do not work in an environment of greed, deceit, and
tyranny.
The Enron Effect: Good Governance =
Good Ownership + Good Citizenship
As for ethics and values, before Enron, critics often argued that morality had no
legitimate role in economic decision making, particularly portfolio management,
because it might weaken financial acumen or interfere with positive rates of return.
Before Enron, they claimed that equity investments should be judged on the basis
of financial performance alone because investors have only financial equity at risk,
and that this equity — indeed, the corporation itself — is a persona ficta, lacking a
soul. Before Enron, critics argued that the best judge of corporate responsibility
and character lies either within the marketplace or the legal-regulatory system, and
that “do-gooders” should leave well enough alone.
But as we have seen, theirs was not a valid argument. As we have come to
recognize painfully, there is a great deal of “free space” between society’s laws and
the behavior of the market, free space in which corporations and capital do their
thing, sometimes to the detriment of those very owners whose equity is at stake, not
to mention innocent bystanders with little or no standing in the game. Moreover,
neither the marketplace nor the law is adequate to the task of protecting society
from the damages that can be inflicted by excessive speculation, potential
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monopolies or oligopolies created by mergers and acquisitions, or the widening gap
between the haves and the have-nots. (You could make the argument that the
problem with world poverty is not so much the problem of capital inequalities, but
of the failure of governments and market economies, which includes institutional
investors, to alleviate it. But that’s another topic, for another day.)
Yet most of the time, financial criteria rather than non-financial criteria are the
template which most corporate owners use to measure the value of their investments
and the performance of corporate managers. They do not consider the moral
location of the economy and therefore do not view corporate institutions as reflect-
ing moral and political norms. They view the corporation and its performance as
separate from politics and ethics rather than embedded in it. So, too, do they see
themselves as separate from a political and ethical regime, even if their primary
missions have distinct social or charitable or political qualities.
This is a misleading perspective because corporations and industrial sectors are
not value-free. Contained within their structure and operation are assumptions about
what is considered “good” and “right,” “right” or “wrong,” assumptions that
become more coherent and fully developed as the institution or sector cultivates its
specific culture or character. These assumptions, clouded as they may be by the
language of financial statements and quarterly reports, serve as the compass that
guides corporate decision-making and communication. Putting the point another
way, behind the numbers lie certain first-order principles or values — a company’s
moral sense, if you will — that need to be made more explicit, as many thoughtful
observers have recognized.
A striking example of the connection between economic activity and the moral
realm is the semantic similarity of financial and ecclesiastic vocabularies. Terms
such as “good,” “equity,”  “value,”  “mission,” “custodian,”  “trust,” “denomina-
tion,” “capital,” “prudence,” “vest” and “invest,” “redemption” and “redeem,”
“debt,” “saving” and “save,” “bond,” “promissory,” “futures,” and “dispensation”
are examples of words with double meaning. In fact, the word “economy” comes
from the Greek “oikonomia,” which meant “management of the household,” with
the household connected to the production, distribution, and consumption of life’s
necessities. Oikonomia is a multifaceted word that sometimes is translated as
“stewardship,” itself a first cousin of “fiduciary,” which means a designated agent
occupying a special relation of trust, confidence, or responsibility in obligation to
others.
Notions of “fiduciary responsibility” are not absolute; they are relativistic
concepts that have evolved over time. The idea of a fiduciary relation to a fund of
money is rooted in English common law but the legal concept of the “prudent man”
was expressed in a case involving Harvard College 173 years ago.25 The scope of
fiduciary responsibility as applied to institutional investors is subject to definition
by federal agencies under existing laws. These agencies include the private pension
system subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”) and the Department of Labor; investment companies subject to the 1940
Investment Act and the Securities and Exchange Commission; bank trusts subject to
the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Comptroller of the Currency; and public
pension funds, charities, and endowments subject to the Internal Revenue Service,
as well as state laws and the offices of attorneys general.
Under the laws pertaining to the fiduciary role, board members have three duties
to consider in maintaining a trustee’s standard of care. The first is to act as a
prudent person might act in similar circumstances. The second is to avoid conflicts
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of interest. The third is to assure that the organization operates consistently, in
keeping with the rules and laws governing its formulation, and in accordance with
its bylaws and mission. Generally speaking, these duties entail full exercise of the
legal rights of ownership, which includes the purchase and sale of assets, voting
proxies, conveying concerns to corporate boards and management, submitting
proposals for shareholder action at annual meetings, convening shareholder meet-
ings or joining forces with other investors and interested parties on issues of mutual
interest, taking legal action, conducting equity research, hiring outside specialized
agents, and so on.
Thanks to a handful of corporate governance activists, governance concerns are
now considered a significant part of the fiduciary role, even though the focus is on
companies rather than on an investor’s own governance regime. There is significant
room for addressing fiduciary leadership and governance. Similarly, there is room
for addressing the “consistency” standard, meaning the extent to which an
organization’s investment policy and practices integrate the ideals, values, and
principles embedded in its mission statement. The challenge of aligning investment
decisions with institutional mission — with the lowest possible risk of adverse
impact — has yet to be fully met. Certain beneficial fiduciaries, most notably the
$550 million Boston Foundation, socially responsible investment funds, many
religious investors, and a number of prominent pension funds have broken impor-
tant new ground in this territory and serve as models for others to emulate.
In addition to the meaning of “fiduciary,” we also need to be clear about what
“economy” is and what it is not. “Economics” is an array of analytic tools that
apply to diverse situations. It is not a rigid set of universal principles, nor is it a
roadmap for how we should live our lives. What oikonomia and economics both
have in common is recognition, since the time of the ancient Greeks, that there was
no sharp boundary between economic matters and those having to do with social
status, politics, and ethics. The “natural” economy of the household and the world
of the market, as Aristotle taught us, could either advance or undermine the good
life, freedom, and community.26
We have come a long way from Aristotle, but the essential truths remain the
same. Nowadays, although it may provide a glimpse, the marketplace is not a good
gauge of the moral sense of society, or of its institutions. It cannot help us under-
stand what kind of a world we want to live in, what our aspirations are, or how
things might be better. In fact, the marketplace does little to help us maintain our
civic moral bearing. It does little to preserve basic fairness, or justice, or truth
telling. It does little to help us aspire to greatness, the stuff of which our demo-
cratic way of life is made. In fact, within the globalized consumer economy, these
values and democratic ideals have become corroded, with civic virtue giving way to
crass commercialism and a consumer ethic of unbridled consumption.
Yet after Enron and its siblings, we are reminded that corporate profitability and
stock price value provide only a distorted picture of society’s well-being, or of the
extent to which human dignity or freedom are honored. After Enron, we are
reminded that commercialism and consumerism are not enough, that some goods
cannot be bought and sold, and that we have a long way to go before our dynamic
global economy can produce a decent global life.
Returning to the purpose of this article, however, we confront the challenge of
governance, particularly how best to muster the courage and will to improve the
way in which institutional investors handle equity investments. We need to do so
because equity investments carry rights and responsibilities, as well as risks and
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rewards, and because the notion of “equity,” as already has been pointed out, carries
both financial and moral meaning.
Taken literally, equity means “standing,” that one has a stake in an entity,
whether it be a company, as in stock ownership; in a society, as in fair treatment or
social justice; or in a relationship, as in an equitable right or claim. As British
historian Anthony Everitt tells us in his superb biography of Cicero, in ancient
Roman society the notion of equites referred to a class of citizens having commer-
cial concerns; equites were the landed gentry, businessmen, and merchants who
tended to avoid national politics. Originally a military class, equites meant
“knights” whose wealth enabled them to buy a horse for military campaigns. Within
the Roman social hierarchy, equites ranked below the aristocracy, yet were above
the plebs — that is, the urban masses, including shopkeepers, artisans, and landless
farmworkers — and, at the very bottom, the slaves.27
Thus in many ways, “equity” denotes “citizenship.” A contemporary notion of
equity as citizenship was elaborated by the late Harvard government professor
Judith Shklar as social standing, meaning inclusion and respect, symbolized by the
opportunity to vote and to earn a living as well as participation, accountability, and
representation in the polity. One can only speculate as to how much we would have
gained, had she lived to enlighten us, by hearing her tackle the question of citizen-
ship as applied to shareholders, particularly institutional investors.28
With regard to human endeavors, “equity” takes on special importance because it
suggests a capacity to be involved, to participate, to be in a position to chart one’s
course, to be engaged in a process of self-governance. As applied to social capital,
“equity” is a cornerstone of democratic civil society. As applied to human capital,
“equity” is a tenant of nondiscriminatory labor policies. As applied to financial
capital, “equity” is a fundamental fixture of open markets and effective capitalism.
Whatever the capital domain — social, human, and financial — “equity culture”
relies on certain virtues, or else it faces collapse. The least of these is trust, so that
decisions can be made based upon truthful and reliable information, that these
decisions are guided by principles of ethics and fairness, and that “access to equity”
is not just a right but a responsibility, a responsibility for strengthening equity
culture for generations to come. Another requirement for equity culture is knowl-
edge, so that one’s stake in an entity can be managed in a way that promotes growth
and development, prosperity and well-being. A third is sustainability, so that this
growth and development can continue, without inflicting injury or falling victim to
the dangers of greed, ignorance, or hubris.
“Prosperity in the Anglo-American world since World War II has in large
measure been due to the success of equity culture,” says Bob Monks, the widely
acknowledged founding father of the shareholder activism and corporate gover-
nance movement. “Savers around the world search for a mode of investment
through which they can earn the highest return at acceptable risk.
Common stock of publicly traded companies provides investors with a particularly
attractive blend of reward and risk, but only so long as they feel that the market is
honest. Governance is about providing this assurance. Only if investors are convinced
that (1) they are making decisions to buy based on reliable information and (2) that
management is running the enterprise for their benefit will the marketplace value
stocks attractively. It is the element of trust on which the world’s wealth depends.29
The call for common sense and civic virtue, responsible ownership, and fidu-
ciary governance, seeks to strengthen equity culture by promoting civic stewardship
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principles, standards, procedures, and trustee knowledge and competence. The goal
is to help institutional investors fulfill their fiduciary obligation in a manner that
balances long-term financial prosperity with the common good, a noble idea with
ancient roots and enshrined within our democratic ideals.
Restoring Good Governance in
Politics and Civil Society
Before turning to our examination of governance in the private sector, we need to
remember that the governance crisis affects our civic and public life, too. The
remedies cut across these sectors, suggesting new forms of participation and
solidarity that will revitalize civic democracy. Theda Skocpol, professor of govern-
ment and sociology and director the Center for American Political Studies at
Harvard University has studied the interplay of democratic politics and civic
voluntarism in the nation’s history.  In an important new book called Diminished
Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life, Skocpol
addresses the problem of governance in a manner that unintentionally reinforces the
message of this article: that our politics has become dominated by big institutions
which are poorly governed and diminish democracy, but that institutional investors
are in a position to improve matters through proper exercise of their fiduciary role.
Skocpol shows, contrary to prevailing wisdom on both ends of the political
spectrum, that American civic voluntarism “was never predominantly local and
never flourished apart from national government and politics.” She claims that,
“Americans joined and led voluntary associations not merely to interact with friends
and neighbors and solve local problems but also so as to reach out to fellow citizens
of a vast republic and build the organizational capacity to shape national culture
and politics.” She goes on to challenge “the liberal article of faith” that American
society has become steadily more democratic since the 1960s, and asserts that while
the various struggles for civil rights, women’s liberation, world peace, and other
public interest causes broke down old barriers to full participation and put new
issues on the public agenda, “the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s also
inadvertently helped to trigger a reorganization of national civic life, in which
professionally managed associations and institutions proliferated while cross-class
membership associations lost ground….The professionally managed organizations
that dominate American civic life today are, in important respects, less democratic
and participatory than the pre-1960s membership federations they displaced.”30
What we need to strengthen our democracy and civic life, Skocpol tells us, are
not the currently popular remedies of smaller government, more local community
and intimate social participation, or more government subsidies of faith based
institutions, because these proposals can do more harm than good.31 “To correct for
recent civic losses and revitalize American democracy, we must find ways to
nurture national solidarity as well as local community,” she writes. “And we need
national-level reforms with bite, targeted on powerful institutions and nationally
ambitious activists….Leaders who understand the democratic deficits of our overly
professionalized and elitist contemporary civic life can devise new models of
association building, blending the best of the old and the new civic America.” A
good place to start is with “fresh strategies for civic organizing,” and measures that
concentrate on making the national media, elections, and government supportive of
renewed democratic vitality in American civil society.32
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“Over the past third of a century, the old civic America has been bypassed and
shoved to the side by a gaggle of professionally dominated advocacy groups and
nonprofit institutions rarely attached to memberships worthy of the name,” Skocpol
concludes, a perspective that could well be applied to business enterprise and
lobbyists, too. “Ideals of shared citizenship and possibilities for democratic leverage
have been compromised in the process.
Since the 1960s many good things have happened in America. New voices are heard,
and there have been invaluable gains in equality and liberty. But vital links in the
nation’s associational life have frayed, and we need to find creative ways to repair
those links if America is to avoid becoming a country of managers and manipulated
spectators rather than a national community of fellow democratic citizens.
There cannot be any way of going back to the civic world we have lost, but we
Americans can and should look for ways to re-create the best of our civic past in new
forms suited to a renewed democratic future.33
Large or small, you have to laud the various attempts to improve things, and
hope for the best. But as many commentators have pointed out, some major
obstacles must be overcome before “good governance” makes a comeback and our
democratic ideals are fulfilled. First and foremost is genuine campaign finance
reform, which received a recent setback when a three-judge federal court issued a
split decision in a lawsuit challenging McCain-Feingold, the landmark law aimed at
reducing the corrosive role that money plays in politics; while as of this writing,
the full impact of the panel’s ruling had not become clear, it will not detract from
eventual Supreme Court consideration of whether Congress has the right to impose
limits on campaign contributions and expenditures so as to assure integrity in the
electoral process. As it stands, we get what other people pay for when it comes to
political leadership in public life.
Besides money, another obstacle to good governance and our democratic ideals is
our disturbingly low level of political literacy and voter participation. While the
numbers continue to be high regarding American civic engagement, these data do
not translate into political awareness, involvement, and participation: In 1998, 70
percent of American households gave money to worthy causes (with an average
contribution of $1,075), and 55.5 percent (109.4 million) of Americans volunteered
their time. Yet in 2000, the last major election year, only 51.3 percent of Americans
who are eligible to vote did so, according to the Federal Election Commission
(“FEC”).34
The “Vanishing Voter Project” at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government was
organized to understand the greatest threat to democracy: ourselves. Thomas E.
Patterson and news legend Marvin Kalb are co-directors of the project, which
tracked voter participation and attitudes during the 2000 presidential campaign.
“The period from 1960 to 2000 marks the longest ebb in turnout in the nation’s
history,” Patterson writes in his survey analysis. “Fewer voters are not the only sign
that Americans are less interested in political campaigns. Since 1960, participation
has declined in virtually every area of election activity, from the volunteers who
work on campaigns to the viewers who watch televised debates.”35
So what do these numbers tell us? One answer: We seem to take for granted a
democratic franchise for which others around the world are willing to lay down
their lives. Another unsettling one: We may be generous in our giving and volunteer
work, but we leave public governance to others, particularly those with deep
pockets or professional advocacy ties.
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Power and Accountability:
Public Defenders and Regulators React
Let us now return to governance as applied to capital markets and corporate
ownership and management. On April 28, 2003, regulators announced the final
agreement in a landmark $1.4 billion global investment banking settlement regard-
ing conflicts of interest among Wall Street stock research analysts who issued
overly optimistic ratings to attract investment banking business. At SEC headquar-
ters in Washington, Eliot Spitzer, the New York State attorney general, and William
H. Donaldson, the new chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
announced the formal charges and settlement agreement affecting ten of the
nation’s biggest securities firms. “These cases reflect a sad chapter in the history of
American business, a chapter in which those who reaped enormous benefits based
on the trust of investors profoundly betrayed that trust,” said Donaldson. “The cases
also represent an important new chapter in our ongoing efforts to restore investors’
faith and confidence in the fairness and integrity of our markets.”
The settlement, which hinges on the approval of U.S. District Court Judge
William H. Pauley in Manhattan, is widely viewed as changing the way major
investment firms do business and has repercussions that will be felt for years to
come. It also is expected to unleash a firestorm of class-action lawsuits against the
firms, brought by investors who believe they lost money because of tainted research
and who now have powerful legal ammunition to argue their cases. “This is not the
end — this is very much the beginning for those who acted improperly,” Spitzer
said at the announcement, referring to the thousands of class-action cases pending
in courts nationwide. “Everyone won except the investors.” (The settlements do not
preclude government officials from further investigation. “Just wait,” warned
Steven Cutler, the SEC’s head of enforcement and a leading architect of the
agreement, referring to the possible failure of top executives at the investment firms
to provide adequate supervision to analysts.)36
The securities settlement agreement commits the “tainted ten” to a series of
penalties and reforms, including the $1.4 billion payment that is divided into four
parts:
•  penalties ($487.5 million);
•  restitution to investors ($387.5 million);
•  a special “independent-research” fund ($432.5 million); and
•  an “investor-education” program ($80 million), some of which will
also go to the states.
Of the overall $1.4 billion stock-analyst settlement, $399 million will go to the
SEC and $495 million will go directly to the states. The SEC will transfer its $399
million to a so-called “Fair Fund,” a restitution fund providing eventual reimburse-
ment to aggrieved investors; this process is expected to be lengthy and complicated,
according to SEC officials.
The states’ share will be distributed according to population; Massachusetts is
expected to receive $7.8 billion, smaller states such as Maine and Rhode Island are
expected to get just under $4 million, and California, as the biggest state, will
receive roughly $43 million. Rather than directing money to investors, most states
will probably use the proceeds to alleviate the damage caused by crippling budget
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deficits; roughly half the states, including New York, Texas, Massachusetts, and
Maine, are required by state law to deposit their share of the penalties and fines into
the state’s general fund.
In addition to the $487.5 million in penalties, the brokerage firms have agreed to
pay $432.5 million into an independent-research fund, with seven of the ten paying
$80 million into an investor-education program. On the latter, the SEC, New York
Stock Exchange, and National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) will use
$52.5 million for an Investor Education Fund, overseen by an Investor Protection
Trust (“IPT”), with the remaining $27.5 million paid to state securities regulators
for investor education. At the April press conference announcing the settlement,
both Spitzer and Donaldson claimed that the investor-education fund would have
far-reaching benefits.
In May 2003, Judge Pauley told the SEC that he wanted more information as to
how the settlement money would be returned to investors, used to educate the
public, and pay for independent research. The SEC responded in mid-June with a
filing that suggested “an administrator appointed by the court should decide who
should get payouts from the settlement and in what proportion,” according to the
New York Times.37
As of this writing, no further information could be obtained regarding the
implementation of the settlement agreement. There are some clues as to the ways
and means of distributing the investor education funds, but no information regard-
ing the substance or content of investor education, beyond general reference to
national and local distribution channels. Pending court approval, the Investor
Protection Trust is expected to be the grantmaking agent, with a proposal review
and grantmaking process currently under construction; the IPT expects to begin its
grantmaking activities in the summer/fall of 2003, according to information posted
on its website at www.investorprotection.org.38
In spite of what appears to be an above-board process, one cannot help but think
that the fix is in, or at the very least, behind the scenes jockeying for this money
has already begun. A fair and open process of decision making is vitally important
to determine how the money will be spent, just what is meant by “investor educa-
tion”, and the criteria and methods for accessing funding to carry it out. Also
needed is an objective, authoritative, and informed mechanism, perhaps a Commis-
sion on Fiduciary Education, that can develop a set of principles and standards for
investor education and training, which improves their capacity to discharge their
fiduciary roles and responsibilities effectively. Someone of the caliber of former
SEC chair Arthur Levitt, who was an outspoken advocate of investor education, to
preside over any such initiative would bolster not just investor confidence, but
demonstrate that ownership is a responsibility, not an entitlement.
The settlement caps a process begun in the wake of the series of accounting
scandals affecting such big companies as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and
Tyco. It eventually put some of Wall Street’s most prominent investment firms in
the crosshairs of public prosecutors and regulators, and now they will have to pay
for their sins. Citigroup, Inc. and its brokerage business, Salomon Smith Barney,
will pay the biggest fine, $300 million, plus $75 million toward the independent-
research fund and $25 million to the investor-education program. Credit Suisse
Group’s Credit Suisse First Boston unit has agreed to pay combined costs of $200
million; so has Merrill Lynch & Co. Morgan Stanley Co. will pay $125 million;
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. will pay $110 million; and Bear Stearns Cos., J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., UBS AG’s Paine Webber,
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and US Bancorp’s Piper Jaffrey unit will each pay $80 million in combined
penalties and payments to the independent-research and investor-education funds.
(One brokerage firm not covered by the agreement was Deutsche Bank AG, which
has agreed to pay a $50 million fine.)
The investigation began in 2001, when attorney general Spitzer opened an
inquiry into the research practices of Merrill Lynch, which continued to recommend
Internet stocks after they had lost much of their value. After winning a $100
million settlement, Spitzer — widely expected to make a bid for New York’s
gubernatorial seat — then expanded the investigation to a dozen other firms. Other
regulators and industry groups, including the SEC, the state regulators’ trade group,
the National Association of Securities Dealers, and the New York Stock Exchange,
joined in.
In December 2002, the group announced a tentative framework for a compre-
hensive settlement, in which the firms neither admitted nor denied guilt but agreed
to pay the $1.4 billion fine. Furthermore, they are obliged to separate their stock
research operations from their investment banking activity, establishing a “clear
bright line” that will prevent conflicts of interest between bankers and analysts. The
agreement also prohibits the practice of special treatment, called “spinning,”
provided to privileged banking clients who were given advance notice of upcoming
public stock offerings, at the expense of smaller investors. Indeed, securities firms
must disclose whether they do business with the companies they are analyzing.
What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which the announcement truly
changes the way business is done, particularly in an era when “pure,”
“unconflicted,” or “untainted” information is hard to come by. Since the October
1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which eliminated the traditional barriers
between the commercial and investment banks, just about anything goes in the
financial services industry.39 In a wired world with electronic communication
making any kind of information instantly accessible, it is, perhaps, unrealistic to
assume that the “clear bright line” or “Chinese wall” between bankers and analysts
will not be breached. Similarly, in a fast-moving global economy, by the time
analysts have done their job and their research has reached the investor, it may be
out of date. Indeed, many institutional investors conduct their own investment
research, or, with so-called “soft-dollar” arrangements, obtain it at little or no cost
in exchange for providing investment firms with their brokerage business; the days
of paying high prices for equity analysts are probably over.
Finally, no one seemed to care about conflicts of interest until stock prices began
to fall. And since the agreement affects only those with ties to the investment
banking world, other investment officials — mutual funds, for example — can
continue to hype certain investments and give advice that may or may not be good.
This is a special cause for worry, as the mutual fund industry is where most inves-
tors have placed their money and faith.
Left unsaid were the contributions of all players — particularly institutional
investors, which have chased quarterly earnings like a rabid dog chasing its tail —
to the high stakes, high-pressure climate of globalized capital and corporate
goliaths. The real problem may not be so much the actions of certain individuals or
firms as much as the basic business model they follow, one that emphasizes the
authority and power of intermediaries who have forgotten their fiduciary obligation
to the investor/owners they are supposed to serve. Even worse are those investors
and owners — particularly institutional investors — who have failed to fulfill their
fiduciary role as responsible owners, committed to assuring that every aspect of
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their investments meet legally prescribed standards of care. One is hard-pressed to
see how, as SEC chairman Donaldson asserts, we can “restore investors’ faith and
confidence in the fairness and integrity of our markets” if we do not have faith and
confidence in the investors themselves.
Power and Accountability:
Congress and Regulators React
In addition to lawyers, state officials, professors, and consultants, Congress and the
SEC have been especially busy addressing corporate governance matters. By far the
most important is the omnibus law passed over a year ago: On July 30, 2002,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), a 78-page piece of
antifraud landmark legislation that addressed nearly every aspect of financial
reporting. President Bush signed it into on August 1, 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley was a
sweeping response to the corporate scandals (and the subsequent loss of wealth on
the part of influential congressional constituents) and was aimed squarely at
improving corporate accountability and governance.
The goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as contained in its Preamble, is “to protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.”40 It is widely viewed as
perhaps the strictest legislation affecting capital markets since the Great Depression.
It will place demands on corporate boards of directors, forcing them to play a
greater oversight role, one for which they were originally intended.41 Whether it
lives up to this expectation remains to be seen: At the end of the day, an ethic of
integrity cannot be legislated or regulated, and you cannot always fix things by
passing a law.
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act triggered a series of remedial actions, all
aimed at increasing director and auditor independence, corporate accountability,
and, by extension, market credibility and the public trust. Most notable is the
creation of a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (now nicknamed
“Peekaboo”), which has been organized to regulate accounting; last April, the SEC
appointed William J. McDonough, longtime president of the Federal Reserve of
New York, as its first chairman.42 After an acrimonious debate over who should
serve as chairman of this important new oversight body — one that eventually led
to the resignation of Harvey Pitt, the SEC’s former chairman — McDonough’s
appointment was unanimously endorsed by SEC commissioners, and widely praised
by corporate governance experts, business leaders, and public officials. He was
formally approved by the SEC on May 21, 2003.
Speaking to participants last March at a session on corporate accountability
hosted by the Palm Beach based Coudert Institute, Jeremy Wiesen, a securities law
and regulation expert who teaches at the Stern School of Business at New York
University, opined, “The [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act is more interesting to read than its
parent, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘the ’34 Act’), because it deals with
what people do, not where securities go. The ’34 Act created the Securities and
Exchange Commission (‘the SEC’ or ‘the Commission’) and set a framework for
the regulation of companies that have gone public pursuant to the Securities Act of
1933 (‘the ’33 Act’). Sarbanes-Oxley is more than just a fine tuning of that legisla-
tion — it puts flesh on a seventy year-old skeleton.”43
Chief among Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions is the requirement that publicly traded
companies disclose corporate information on a current and continuous basis (called
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“Real Time Issuer Disclosures”), thus augmenting the filing of Form 10-Q
quarterly reports and Form 10-K annual reports. Previously, the SEC and
equity analysts had to rely on corporate press releases for material information.
Moreover, since disclosure by itself is not enough unless you also have a review
and enforcement mechanism, Sarbanes-Oxley now requires that every issuer
have its periodic reports reviewed by the SEC at least once every three years.
Other important aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act include the requirements
that
•  chief executive officers and chief financial officers certify their
companies’ annual and quarterly reports;44
•  lawyers have a whistle-blowing responsibility;45
•  personal loans to any executive officer or director, with certain
exceptions, are prohibited;46
•  corporate board audit committees be independent (and open to
communicating with whistle-blowers);47
•  a set of internal controls be established and maintained in the
form of a “management letter,” certified by the CEO and CFO;48
•  companies report on whether they have — and if not, why not —
a code of ethics for senior financial officers that covers “honest
and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or
apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional
relationships; full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable
disclosure in the periodic reports required to be filed; and com-
pliance with applicable government rules and regulations;49
•  corporate reports, particularly in the code of ethics section, be
“understandable” and in “plain English”;50
•  company “pro forma” financial information be consistent with
Generally Agreed Accounting Principles (“GAAP”);51
•  the SEC pass rules, within one year, that will “improve the
objectivity of research and provide investors with more useful
and reliable information”;52
•  audit committees “establish procedures for . . . the confidential,
anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters,” including
protection for whistle-blowers and penalties against those who
would prevent whistle-blowing;53  and
•  the SEC conduct a series of studies, including ones affecting the
adoption of a principles-based accounting system, more efficient
methods to provide restitution to injured investors, new disclo-
sure rules for off-balance sheet assets, the role and function of
credit rating agencies, and a self-study of SEC enforcement
actions over the previous five years.54
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Other Corporate Crackdowns
Although it is by far the most comprehensive, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was not the
only reform action in the post-Enron environment. Other state agencies, the stock
exchanges, the National Association of Securities Dealers, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (“FASB”), and other regulatory organizations also adopted stricter
measures, particularly those promoting greater board “independence” — a slippery
notion, to be sure, but usually defined in terms of organizational status (that is, one
is not an employee of nor does one do business with a company), rather than
qualities of judgment or equity interest in a firm’s operation. Indeed, “indepen-
dence” is a state of being, not necessarily a virtue; as noted corporate governance
expert Nell Minow puts it, “independent” can mean “indifferent,” and is not
necessarily a guarantee of competence or anything else.55
Whatever its meaning, the idea of independence is the Holy Grail of corporate
governance, and its reality remains just as elusive given the extraordinary number
of formal and informal ties among directors, which reduce the likelihood of
opposing one’s colleagues. The logical assumption that good corporate governance
flows from board independence is a flawed one—good theory, perhaps, but
oftentimes untenable in practice. “There’s something utterly anomalous, talking
about a participant in a self-perpetuating institution being independent. People are
satisfied with the apparent independence of a director, notwithstanding the fact that
every single one of them is part of a self-perpetuating process,” says Bob Monks.
“One doesn’t have to be a cynic, one only needs to be a bit of a behaviorist and a
bit of a psychologist to consider the kind of loyalties that exist among people who
are invited to join elite, highly desirable groups.
If you want to create reform in a club, it probably is not the best thing to do to become
a member of the club, because there is an implicit if not legal — I would say emotional
— undertaking that you agree, as part of the position of joining the group, to work
within the culture of the group. And the culture of the group is that you will work out
your problems with the group within the group…
[In March 2002] Alan Greenspan gave a speech at NYU’s Stern School of
Business. Now Alan Greenspan is not a governance scholar, but is obviously a man
of huge prestige and fine intellect. In reviewing the governance landscape, he
concluded as follows, I never met an independent director. There’s no such thing.
They’re basically people whose continued existence is at the gift of a CEO, and
therefore is in no way independent of a CEO. He then concluded rather strangely, I
thought, that shareholders, whom he considers to be the logical choice to be monitors,
choose not to be. Now Greenspan left it at that point, and then went and segued
further and came to the only logical conclusion that he could, which was that whether
we liked it or not, we were in the hands of a CEO, and we better hope the CEO is
benevolent.
Now if a CEO is not only not benevolent, but is toxic… I think Greenspan’s
conclusion is wrong, but you have to go back for a minute to his point, which
underlies much of the futility of the shareholder movement, and that is that even the
most dispassionate learned observer like Alan Greenspan will look at the landscape
and will say that shareholders choose not to act as responsible owners, and then
moves on as if that’s okay. One doesn’t have to be an ethicist to simply question the
appropriateness of someone who has responsibility being in any way allowed by their
own determination to undertake not to be accountable for their responsibility.56
Nevertheless, the notion of independence continues to reign supreme, providing
the illusion of objectivity and good judgment. The New York Stock Exchange, for
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example, allocates twelve of its twenty-four board seats to individuals from outside
the securities industry; last spring, Madeleine K. Albright, former Secretary of
State, accepted nomination to one of these two-year directorships, which was voted
by the Big Board’s membership in early June. Again, one is hard-pressed to imagine
Secretary Albright as an “outsider” of any sort, proving the adage that in corporate
governance as well as every other realm, the power of networks and connections
reigns supreme, not “independence” by virtue of one’s affiliation, expertise, or
politics.
Secretary Albright stepped into a situation that already was controversial. The
NYSE board vacancy occurred in early 2003, when Martha Stewart stepped down
as a result of charges that she had engaged in securities fraud and insider trading;
subsequently Citigroup Inc. chairman and CEO Sanford Weill was nominated,
which ignited further controversy and heated opposition (particularly from Eliot
Spitzer because Weill’s company was a target in the regulatory probe) and eventu-
ally led to Weill’s withdrawal. (On July 16, Weill made the surprise announcement
that he was stepping down as chief of Citigroup at the end of 2003, but that he
would remain as chairman until the spring of 2006.)
Because of this and other warning bells, on May 15, 2003 the NYSE announced
its intention to conduct a review of its own corporate governance procedures, which
were to include several days of hearings as well as written commentary from its
various constituents.  The format of this review process and whether or not it will
be open to the public had not been decided when this article was written. But as a
first step in that process, on June 5 the NYSE board adopted a revised set of ten
governance proposals, which address a number of issues including conflicts of
interest and salary disclosure regarding its top officials. Meanwhile, a special board
committee will review other governance matters, including board size, composi-
tion, and tenure, and whether to split the roles of chairman and chief executive.
Leon E. Panetta, the former White House chief of staff who is co-chair of the
special committee on corporate governance (former New York state treasurer H.
Carl McCall is the other co-chair) described its mission as bringing “the governance
of this institution into the 21st century.”57
The New York Stock Exchange is a self-regulated exchange and a nonprofit
corporation owned by its 1,366 members. Nell Minow likens it to a duckbilled
platypus because, just as a platypus is a living creature, and is not classified as a
mammal or a bird, the NYSE has the force of federal law, yet is not accountable to
the financial markets or the political process.58 Even though it has acted as an
advocate for good corporate governance among its members, the exchange’s own
governance had come under fire for, among other things, its compensation practices
and alleged conflicts of interest, with top exchange officials also serving on NYSE-
listed companies.59 Earlier this year, SEC chairman Donaldson asked the Big Board
to report on its practices, implying it should practice what it preached; many
observers believe the exchange should be held to a higher standard, and serve as a
role model of corporate governance.
Back in August 2002, the board of the NYSE adopted a revised set of listing
standards aimed at strengthening corporate governance and investor confidence in
the more than 2,800 companies that list on the exchange. The newer listing require-
ments, originally proposed by the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing
Standards Committee in June 2002, include the following key provisions: corporate
boards must be composed of a majority of independent directors, except for those
boards where voting power is controlled by a group or individual rather than the
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public; nominating, compensation, and audit committees must be composed entirely
of independent directors; and companies must seek shareholder approval for stock
option plans, with the exception of one-time stock option grants to newly hired
executives. The proposed listing rules also require that the independent directors of
listed firms meet regularly without management, or insiders, present, and that audit
committees meet with auditors without insiders present. The listing requirements
are subject to public review and comment; in June 2003, the Securities and
Exchange Commission approved those proposals regarding equity compensation,
and continues to review other aspects of NYSE’s rule changes.
In addition to these NYSE actions, in the summer of 2002 the board of the
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) approved a comprehensive array of corporate
governance measures intended to form a framework for new rules that would
increase disclosure requirements, strengthen audit committee responsibility and
board oversight, and enhance shareholder rights. According to published reports,
the AMEX governance measures redefine what is meant by “board independence.”
They also require timely disclosure of board changes and vacancies; prohibit any
AMEX employee or floor member from serving on the board of an AMEX-listed
company; that audit committees be chaired by an individual with substantial
financial experience; that audit committees approve all related party transactions;
that shareholders approve all stock option plans; that AMEX-listed firms hold at
least quarterly board and audit committee meetings; and that listed companies adopt
a code of ethics and implement a compliance program.60 In July 2003, AMEX filed
its proposed listing rule changes with the SEC, which will be reviewed, possibly
modified, and then issued for public comment.
Not to be outdone, in July 2002 the Nasdaq Stock Market’s board of directors
approved more than twenty-five new corporate governance reform proposals aimed
at increasing the transparency and accountability of firms listed on the exchange.
The Nasdaq proposals had four major objectives: increase board independence by
requiring a majority of board member be outsiders; strengthen the role of indepen-
dent directors in compensation and nominating committees; mandate continuing
educations for directors; and mandate the acceleration of disclosure of transactions
by corporate insiders. On March 17, 2003, the SEC published these proposed
Nasdaq rule changes for public comment. In June 2003, The Corporate Library
reported that the SEC was attempting to reconcile the proposed NYSE and Nasdaq
rule changes with regard to director independence.
In an interview held late last year, Richard F. Syron, chairman and chief execu-
tive officer of Thermo Electron Corporation, was asked for his thoughts about the
flurry of reform in a post-Enron environment. When Syron speaks, people listen, as
his illustrious career attests. Holding a Ph.D. in economics from Tufts University,
Syron also has experience both as a regulator and business manager, with stints as
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and the American Stock Exchange
before joining Thermo Electron in 1999.
While at the Fed, Syron was a high-profile leader who was unafraid to speak his
mind on such controversial issues as the impact of race on lending practices and the
wave of banking failures that swept the nation in the early 1990s; he is credited
with helping to keep many New England banks solvent. During his five-year tenure
at AMEX, Syron was responsible for finding new securities listings for trade, as
well as the merger of the exchange with the National Association of Securities
Dealers, the Nasadaq parent. At Thermo Electron, which is based in Waltham,
Massachusetts, he successfully has overseen a massive company-wide restructuring
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featuring higher degrees of transparency and synergy. Equally at ease in the worlds
of theory or practice (and able to connect the two), Dick Syron gracefully displays
the civic stewardship qualities advanced in this article.
What, he is asked, is the remedy for corporate corruption and governance
failures? “You can do all the regulations in the world you want, and some of them
will have some beneficial effect, but there are two things,” he said. “One is, crooks
are going to find ways to do crooked things, no matter what [regulations] you
write. The other is, you have to get investors and everyone else to have a longer-
term view of things. You put all that together, and you’ve got a recipe that doesn’t
work very well…
The first issue we’ve got to address is, over what time frame are we trying to get
people to focus? We talk about the stock market — but there isn’t one stock market.
You have traders, you have investors, you have long-term holders, you have churners,
and so on. It’s easy to say, and it’s not advice that I always follow myself, but you
have to learn to ignore the short-term noise. Easy to say, hard to do, but wisdom
comes with time...
The primary reason why the Federal Reserve was set up was to take into consider-
ation that there are some things that you take actions on that won’t be immediately
popular, but that are the right things to do in the longer run. And you know, the same
challenge applies to companies and the [investment] funds.61
Where Are We Now?
So what do these various proposals, laws, and rules changes mean for restoring
investor confidence and improving board composition and competence? And what
lasting imprint have they left on our federal system of checks and balances?
The answers to these questions are hard to give, because there is so little infor-
mation about compliance; a major problem here is the fact that with respect to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, major parts of the bill’s 68 sections are not even in effect yet,
making thorough evaluation of its impact impossible. By its first anniversary,
noncompliance with its provisions, which was supposed to result in hefty fines or
even jail time, could not be determined because there is no central clearinghouse of
information. It takes time to digest the new rules, assemble qualified staff, and
begin the process of implementation; the SEC, public companies, and legions of
lawyers, accounting firms, insurance companies, and other consultants have
scrambled to do so as they also seek clarification of what compliance really means.
Most observers believe that it will take several years before a final verdict can be
reached as to what works and what does not.
One year after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, much survey evidence suggests
that corporate executives are beginning to suffer from “governance fatigue” as they
implement the law’s provisions, remain divided as to whether or not the law has
helped to boost investor competence, and continue to experience corporate gover-
nance problems. There continues to be a good deal of executive grumbling about
the Act’s scale and scope. In March of this year, a study by PricewaterhouseCoopers
stated that roughly 85 percent of corporate boards and management have begun the
process of revising their governance and operating standards and procedures,
usually including provisions for more independent directors. But only 9 percent of
executives considered Sarbanes-Oxley an effective antidote to corporate malfea-
sance, with 42 percent claiming that compliance will impose unnecessary costs, and
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82 percent expressing confidence that their firms were already in compliance with
the Act’s principles.62
The good news / bad news message of these corporate executives contradicts the
findings of the IRRC. The annual IRRC survey of the Standard & Poor’s Super
Composite 1500 revealed that while the top 1,500 companies listed on the NYSE
may be working hard to meet new corporate governance requirements proposed by
the NYSE and other stock exchanges, many companies still have a long way to go.
Only 51 percent of the companies have formed governance committees, and a mere
13 percent currently meet the NYSE requirement that corporate boards have a
majority independent directors. Twenty-nine percent of audit committees, 25
percent of compensation committees and 48 percent of nominating committees at
the firms surveyed still fail the NYSE’s independence test.63
 Notwithstanding these claims and counterclaims, many boards have engaged in
special training programs — which have sprung up everywhere — or sent their
members to those that are springing up throughout the nation’s business and law
schools to help them hone their director skills. Boards also have struggled to define
the qualities and characteristics a “good” board member should have. But not
everyone on the company side is happy with the newer demands on board perfor-
mance, and the fines and penalties that await those who fail to perform well.
Already, insiders have noticed a recent tendency of some board members to move
off of boards, primarily due to liability concerns.64
How board members are nominated and selected will be the acid test of many of
these reforms; as it stands, the process is still heavily rooted in informal buddy
networks and CEO preference, rather than one that — as in organized politics —
draws candidates from the voter population, asks them to state their views or
platform, and fields them in a series of primaries or slates. Recent SEC proposals
and changes to the New York Stock Exchange listing standards have helped some-
what; corporate board nominating committees are now required to be composed of
outside independent directors to assure transparency and accountability. The next
step — one not yet taken — will be to have institutional investors serve on these
nominating committees to help assure less of a rarefied board atmosphere and better
shareholder representation.
Meanwhile, a study released in November 2002 by the Washington-based
Investor Responsibility Research Center (“IRRC”), an authoritative source of
corporate responsibility information, found that 70 percent of S&P 500 companies
and 66 percent of New York Stock Exchange-listed firms will have to make changes
to their boards to meet pending requirements for director independence. Only 74
percent of S&P 1500 companies have nominating committees, and only half of
those are independent. Almost all S&P 1500 companies have compensation and
audit committees, but only 73 percent of audit committees and 71 percent of
compensation committees could be considered independent.65
As for federalism, the backlash regarding state’s rights and federal power has
already begun. After all, it was a state attorney general who went after Wall Street,
not the SEC. Even though they ended up working closely together, there are a lot
of hurt feelings and lingering resentments that the states had pre-empted what the
Federal government was supposed to do. In late spring of 2003, congressional
Republicans attempted to curtail the power of state regulators and boost the ability
of the SEC to collect penalties for securities fraud and direct them to victims of
securities violations. These proposals, contained in a bill before the House Financial
Services Committee, were loudly rebuked by Eliot Spitzer — widely believed to be
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their target for his zealous prosecution of offenders — and ignited a firestorm of
opposition from those who claimed that the SEC was kowtowing to Wall Street and
Capitol Hill. On July 24th, the House committee pulled the measure after some
SEC officials privately told House Republicans that this was not an auspicious time
to call a vote; it was postponed until September 2003.66
See How They Run
For many years I have argued that we will see the day when elections for boards of
directors, corporate and institutional investor alike, will resemble that which we
have in public life, replete with nominating conventions, some version of political
parties or affinity groups, platforms and planks, electoral campaigns, debates, and
the other trappings of democratic self-governance — perhaps even political consult-
ants. (Move over, James Carville.)
A precedent for this was Bob Monks’s 1991 campaign for a seat on the Sears,
Roebuck board of directors, a move that sent shockwaves through the then-nascent
shareholder activism movement. Moreover, I predict we will see much more
activism directed to entire industries, similar to current efforts being waged on by
groups such as CERES and the Global Reporting Initiative on environmental
matters.67 Up next will be more vigorous investor pressures on the pharmaceutical
and drug industries as well as the media and entertainment industries to produce
better quality products and adhere to agreed-upon standards and practices aimed at
positive financial and ethical performance; the work of Carol Atwood and
Spartacus Media Enterprises, sponsor of “Investing in Media that Matters,” a
conference held this past January at Sundance Village, is headed in this direction.68
The signs of more robust corporate board elections already have started to
appear, particularly involving union pension funds that are seeking better represen-
tation. Depending upon the final outcomes of the SEC’s proposed rule changes on
shareholder access to board nomination and election, board elections will become
even more interesting. But considering the state of modern electoral politics, which
has become divisive and dominated by big money and special interests, whether this
is a good thing remains to be seen.
On the professional service side, accounting firms have revised their operations,
while law firms and financial advisors have made adjustments in how they advise
their clients. Academic institutions have rolled out special training programs. Amid
all of this, not surprisingly, a flurry of consultant firms have opened up shop,
issued studies and press releases, and identified areas for improvement — improve-
ments they consider themselves best suited to make. And insurance companies are
reaping huge financial benefits, as the cost of liability insurance for board members
has risen dramatically, with shareholder claims totaling billions of dollars.69
Nevertheless, as with the measures affecting tighter controls on securities firms,
left undone are mechanisms for assuring that investors are doing their job, or are
making good decisions. We still do not have a “fiduciary creed”, or a working
model of “good fiduciary governance,” beyond the elastic assumptions of fiduciary
law. Corporate oversight without attentive, informed, and engaged investors is like
political oversight without attentive, informed, and engaged voters: You cannot
expect good governance from the former when most of the latter have abdicated
their responsibilities, stayed home, and watched TV.
The time has come to move forward with a new kind of “voter education
project,” in the sense of where institutional investors are able to understand and act
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upon the fundamentals of good governance, as some companies are doing. As with
the League of Women Voters or the civil rights movement, this means educating
shareowners about the franchise they possess, and encouraging them to use it. But
more than voting, it means shareholders understand their rights and responsibilities
as owners, who are now in a position to improve the governance and operation of
the companies and industries in which they hold stakes.
In procedural terms, this involves greater levels of transparency, accountability,
participation, and representation, so that shareowner interests and values are truly
fulfilled. In substantive terms, it also involves greater grounding in those civic
virtues — including honesty, integrity, fairness, justice, and reciprocal obligation
— that reinforce an ethic of trust and healthy community. Overall, it means that
institutional investors articulate policies and practices that embed the principles of
good governance into their mode of doing business, thereby increasing levels of
participation, accountability, and representation regarding those beneficiaries who
are the ultimate bearers of economic risk. It means they pledge themselves to a
standard of good fiduciary governance that mirrors the same framework of expecta-
tions they apply to corporations.
Doing this would place investors in a better position to monitor not just corpo-
rate but their own performance, thus contributing to wiser stewardship on the part
of investor governing boards that, in theory, represent the long-term interests of
beneficiaries, whoever they might be. Doing this means we will need new struc-
tures, new forms of education and training, new role descriptions, and new
resources to assure that owner and investors have the necessary knowledge and
expertise to perform their tasks well. The reason this is so important is that the
problem of market credibility and corporate governance is also a problem of
fiduciary failure on the part of owners and investors, as well as the other legal and
regulatory power failures that have been identified.
Guardians of the Public Interest:
The Role of Trustees and Directors in
Preserving Equity Culture and
Restoring Good Fiduciary Governance
Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays
instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
— Edmund Burke
Speech to the Electors of Bristol, 1774
Boston is a privileged area because of its history and values, its institutions, its
culture, and its people. The birthplace of civil society, its New England roots are
deeply planted in an ethic of caring and fairness, inspiring a model of governance
that did not distinguish between public and private realms, a model that was to
serve as the basis for democratic structures to come. The 1629 chartering of the
Massachusetts Bay Corporation, followed soon thereafter by the incorporation of
congregational churches and local townships, and later by Harvard College, set the
stage for the virtues of representative lay governance, with moral commitments and
the competitive spirit of innovation serving as the propellant for reaching
community goals.
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While this model has evolved and changed over time, subject to the prevailing
passions and prejudices of the culture, the guiding principle of colonial life remains
intact: self-governance is a means through which a free people remain free, subject
to rules and conditions that derive from voluntary agreements and obedience to
man-made and nature’s law, one’s conscience, and God.
We need to remind ourselves that at the beginning of American society, with
religious faith and Enlightenment theories as a backdrop, property ownership and
the marketplace were subordinate to civic virtue, and civic virtue was enshrined in
our laws and institutions, including notions of trusteeship. Property ownership, as
envisioned by the Framers in their design of our federal system of checks and
balances, was a ticket to democratic political participation, even though politics was
not the only influence on the evolving economic life of the Republic. Religious
faith and interpretation served as a subtext for how we organized our economic
arrangements, and for how commerce and capitalism, particularly the emergence of
the modern business corporation, came into being. Moral virtue was tied to good
stewardship and the acquisition of wealth, a union sometimes at odds with the spirit
of democracy (citizens without property were excluded from the business of
governing, not unlike modern times wherein big money dominates the electoral
process), yet driving continued public suspicion of any concentration of wealth and
power.
Since John Winthrop’s 1630 call for a covenantal city on a hill and the hege-
mony of Yankee Protestantism (particularly Puritanism and Quakerism), the
relationship between money and morality lie at the heart of two themes that
continue to endure in American public life: the role of piety and faith in building
and sustaining community, and the influence of competition, individualism, and
self-interest in doing so. While Winthrop emphasized the predominance of faith,
family, and community in realizing the American dream, this civic moral frame-
work later gave way to the emerging capitalist order and, by the early 20th century,
receded in importance as capitalists and economists, taking a cue from their 18th
century secular brethren, began to utilize scientific principles in measuring and
managing economic performance.
For three hundred years, the notion of money and morality was not an oxymo-
ron; to the contrary, it was considered an article of faith in American culture,
however tense that relationship might be. At the present time, the tension between
private ownership (meaning corporate equity, evoking the equites of antiquarian
Roman society) and the public interest continues, with trustees and directors serving
as the first line of defense. Cultivating and enacting responsible ownership and
fiduciary governance affects not just the manner in which financial assets are
managed but speaks to the very core of what it means to be a trustee or director.
The primary assumptions governing the role of trusteeship and directorship
became neutered within the past 100 years as a result of the rise of the modern
bureaucratic state and the corporate form, the ascension of scientific management,
and the professionalization and technological transformation of financial services.
Yet being a trustee carries with it representative responsibilities to “the other” or
“others,” so the threshold question becomes, which “others” are we talking about,
and whose interests are being protected and advanced?
Put another way, are trust beneficiaries to be viewed as economic units alone,
with little interest in anything other than the size of a dividend check or a payout?
Or might they also be viewed in more human terms, as individuals with lives to
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lead much as trustees themselves do, who breathe the same air, are vulnerable to
illness and disease, to the same eruptions in the earth’s ecosystem or social systems?
Much like trustees and directors, are not beneficiaries also dependent upon a
civil order that is literate, safe, and respectful of human dignity and creativity?
Indeed, might not these very same beneficiaries be qualified to vote?  Are they not
— as are we — citizens, too?  Do they watch television, surf the Internet, read
books and newspapers, listen to music, or admire (perhaps even create?) works of
art?  Do they seek to learn, or (to use that hackneyed phrase), develop their full
potential, not just in childhood or adolescence, but throughout their lives?
What we are talking about here are whole human persons, with needs and wants,
aspirations and dreams. Just as a civic stewardship ethic looks at investment perfor-
mance not only empirically but in normative terms as well, restricting itself not just
to financial performance but also addressing ethical and social matters, so, too, does
it call for a trustee role that sees beneficiaries and shareholders as something more
than economic units. They are human persons living as best they can in a natural
world, possessing frailties and vulnerabilities that trusteeship is intended to protect.
Whatever the terminology — trustee, director, custodian, guardian, or curator — its
essence remains the same: one is acting in the interests of someone else, and that
“someone” and “those interests” simply cannot be reduced to coins and paper. At
the end of the day, there is little qualitative difference between the human concerns
of trustees and directors and the human concerns of those they are supposed to
serve and protect.
The fiduciary challenge, then, for trustees and directors (similar to that confront-
ing judges) is to make public decisions that fulfill both the immediate obligations
contained in a charter or mission statement, and the broader public interest obliga-
tions attendant to human health and well-being. Doing this well involves both a
grounding in the particularity of privately-held core beliefs and commitments (call
it “character”), and a broader conception of what we share in the public square, a
place where common rules and common understanding, supported by situational
ethics, legal precedents, and the political art of compromise, come into play.
Trustees and directors are not thermometers, reflecting the temperature of
prevailing opinion. Nor are they bodyguards, whose aim only is “to preserve and
protect.” The aim of trusteeship — indeed, of being trustworthy — is to preserve
the health and long-term interests of those being served, but also to shape and
transform the world in the name of the good. In other words, all trustees are
citizens with a bigger brief, even if not all citizens are trustees. By extension, all
shareholders are citizens, too, even if not all citizens are shareholders.
In A History of Nonprofit Boards in the United States, historian Peter Dobkin
Hall of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government points out that original notions
of trusteeship, whether public or private, reflected substantial civic commitments,
so much so that there was no distinction between public and private domains.
Current corporate and nonprofit governance is rooted in practices dating back to the
nation’s founding; the charter creating the Massachusetts Bay Company, which
created the first American board, “made the rights and privileges of the private
[land] grant equivalent to those of the state.” In addition to the idea of “perpetual
succession” (the right of corporate members to appoint their successors and elect
officers), the fundamentals of trusteeship, in American terms, reflected what was to
become the foundation of democratic civil society in years to come.
Although these democratic structural features were constrained by “powerful
informal norms of deference” to citizens who were more wealthy, white, male, and
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educated than anyone else, the idea of self-governance, with an elect group
entrusted with the responsibility for balancing individual and collective interest,
came to characterize two of the pillars of public life. Hall tells us that “like prop-
erty rights, the roles and responsibilities of boards of directors and the organiza-
tions with which they are associated — as well as the broader legal, governmental,
and economic settings in which they operate — have evolved and changed over
time.” Yet throughout the development of philanthropic and voluntary associations,
our constitutional government, and the business firm, one thing has remained
constant:  All can be interpreted as public enterprises that are engaged in public
service, to the extent that they derive their legitimacy from the governed, and
because, “values and convictions — a sense of stewardship — [are] central to any
and all.”
Indeed, whatever the organization might be, it exists in and draws sustenance
from the complex web of modern life. Boards, and board members, thus become
“’boundary-spanners’ for whom board service joins private and public values . . .
[exercising] unique dual roles as managers of the internal cultures and the external
environments of the entities they serve and, as such, are strategically situated to
have a broadly powerful transformative influence on the world of which they are a
part.”70
In our pluralist society, there is no predominant model of trusteeship beyond its
broad policy setting and oversight role. At the CERES annual conference held this
past April, Holly J. Gregory, one of the nation’s leading experts on board behavior
and corporate governance, and a partner at New York’s Weil, Gotshal & Manges
LLP, talked about the fact that directors’ legal mandate is broad and vague, leaving
a great deal of discretion for interpretation. In order to act prudently and in the
corporation’s best interests, directors need to exhibit good faith, a degree of care,
and the qualities of “an ordinarily prudent person in a like position, under similar
circumstances.” Directors should “reasonably believe” that their actions are in the
best interests of the corporation as they go about the process of selecting, monitor-
ing, evaluating, compensating, and, when necessary, replacing senior management;
reviewing and approving strategic and long-term plans (which involves understand-
ing risks); monitoring corporate performance against these plans; reviewing and
approving material capital allocations, financial standards, and policies; ensuring
financial control and reporting / disclosure integrity, ethical standards, and legal
compliance; monitoring constituent relations; and organizing the board.
Gregory’s remarks included a thumbnail sketch of the newly released Report of
the Blue Ribbon Commission on Risk Oversight: Board Lessons for Turbulent Times,
produced by the National Association of Corporate Directors.71 The report outlined
the fiduciary responsibilities directors have for overseeing adequate risk manage-
ment, which can help prevent future corporate scandals. A prerequisite is a corpo-
rate governance framework enabling informed and sound judgments. Other
requirements include understanding the specific risks facing organizations board
members serve, and ensuring that there is a process in place to alert them to the
occurrence of those risks. Boards should ensure that management has identified the
specific material risks the company faces, including short-term and long-term risks,
as well as intrinsic and extrinsic risks. Directors “should be ‘risk-minded’ as they
review [organizational] reporting, operations, and compliance,” while being
“sensitive to the impact that specific risks may have on each group of stakeholders,
including employees, customers, suppliers, and local community groups.” More-
over, boards should ensure that continual reevaluation of risk management practices
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In modern society the basic mechanisms of justice are becoming more and more
economic rather than political, in the sense that economic power is the most basic
power. Political power is derived from it to such a degree that a just political order is
not possible without the reconstruction of the economic order. Specifically this means
the reconstruction of the property system. . . .
The fact is that democratic principles and traditions are an important check upon the
economic oligarchy, even though the money power is usually able to bend democracy
to its uses. The proof that this democratic restraint is still vital is given by the effort of
the economic power to abrogate democracy when the latter imperils the rule of the
financial oligarchs.
— Reinhold Niebuhr
               An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, 1935
In a significant regulatory decision that invigorates equity culture, earlier this
year the Securities and Exchange Commission determined that the shareholder
suffrage, the power to vote proxy resolutions, was both a public matter of corporate
governance and a fiduciary duty of corporate monitoring. Consistent with the
transparency mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley, which delegated broad rulemaking
authority to the SEC, on January 23, 2003 the SEC, after a heated process of public
review, voted 4-1 to adopt new rules for mutual funds.
The new SEC rules — “Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting
Records by Registered Management Investment Companies” and “Proxy Voting by
Investment Advisers” — require mutual funds and investment advisers to reveal
their guidelines and procedures for proxy voting, as well as the actual voting
records. Taking effect in July 2003, the proxy disclosure requirements affect an
industry representing some 95 million Americans who invest in mutual funds,
directly or as an option in their 401(k) or other employer-provided retirement plan.
The combined assets of the roughly 3,700 mutual funds now on the market repre-
sent $6.5 trillion, accounting for roughly 21 percent of ownership in American
companies.73
In 1999 the $130 billion California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(“CalPERS”) was the first pension fund and the $1.3 billion Domini Social Invest-
ments (with proxy voting guideline assistance provided by KLD Research &
Analytics, Inc., a Boston-based corporate social research firm) the first mutual fund
to disclose its proxy voting policy and voting records. Along with the AFL-CIO
and Teamsters, Domini Social Investments played an instrumental role in launching
a chain of events leading to SEC adoption of proxy disclosure rules, which continue
to remain contentious. On November 21, 2001, Amy Domini wrote a letter to SEC
chairman Pitt urging proxy disclosure, following similar appeals by the Teamsters
earlier that year and the AFL-CIO in late 2000; these actions were accompanied by
a massive letter-writing and email campaign resulting in thousands of messages sent
to SEC officials.74 Meanwhile, last March, two months after the SEC proxy
disclosure decision, the AFL-CIO and other labor unions urged mutual funds to
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disclose how they vote on corporate proxies this year, rather than wait for SEC
rules to take effect in 2004.
The proposed proxy disclosure rules invited vigorous opposition from the mutual
fund industry, led by the Investment Company Institute’s emissaries Edward “Ned”
C. Johnson III, Fidelity Investments chief executive, and John Brennan, Vanguard
Group chief, who asserted that requiring mutual fund managers to disclose their
votes on corporate proxies would politicize proxy voting. (Fidelity and Vanguard
are the two largest mutual fund companies in the world, with respective assets of
more than $799 and $575 billion under management.) A prominent dissenter to this
wall of resistance was John C. Bogle, Vanguard’s founder and former CEO, who
agreed with the SEC’s proposed rules.
“A fund manager’s focus belongs on investment management, not on becoming
an arbiter of political and social disputes,” Johnson and Brennan argued in a Wall
Street Journal op ed piece, and continued by offering an alternative that locates
voting and monitoring authority more centrally, in the hands of mutual fund
boards. “Instead of all the regulation, why not simply enhance the proxy oversight
role of mutual fund boards? Ensure that they hold their companies to clearly
established proxy voting guidelines. Let them see that fund managers’ votes are
consistent with the company’s guidelines — subject to SEC examination.”75
Another major institutional investor opposing the proxy disclosure measure was
the $262 billion Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Retirement
Equity Fund (“TIAA-CREF”), on the grounds that public reporting would expose
certain shareholders to “undue pressure” from corporate management.76
What these critics failed to acknowledge is the extent to which the investment
process has already become politicized, responding to the special interests of
business and trade groups, corporate insiders, and — in a highly concentrated
ownership universe — large institutional investors and money managers. Share-
holder activism is but one in a broad array of forces influencing corporate decision-
making. Meanwhile, Brennan and Johnson’s proposal to expand proxy oversight
responsibilities of a mutual fund’s board fails to address the widespread current
concerns about transparency, and fails to acknowledge the reality that the gover-
nance of mutual fund boards remains a “black box” for investors, with little or no
accountability to fund participants. The absence of a prevailing theory or frame-
work, ethic, and vocabulary on responsible ownership and fiduciary governance, as
well as models, standards, and practices begs the question of full disclosure and is
the animating force of this article.
The disclosure critics also consider social and political concerns as distinct from
financial ones; this is a spurious claim, given the interrelationships between norma-
tive and empirical considerations, as has been demonstrated repeatedly. Indeed, for
several decades investors, business managers, accountants, and academic researchers
have developed various models for measuring the performance of tangible and
intangible assets, including human and social capital. Whatever the terminology —
corporate social responsibility, reputation analysis, ethical investing, social auditing,
sustainable governance, triple-bottom-line, social venture capital, and so on — the
objective is the same: to assure prudent performance of financial assets in accor-
dance with solid principles of fiduciary duty and democratic pluralism.77
Finally, critics argue that the increased paperwork burdens and costs will harm
mutual fund shareholders, another spurious claim given the availability of
electronic and Internet technology and the high fees and compensation packages
paid to managers. Moreover, under the provisions of the Employee Retirement
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Income Security Act (“ERISA”), corporate pension funds have been under the same
obligation. Thanks both to Bob Monks’s leadership as assistant Secretary of Labor,
who opined that proxy voting was a tangible asset with beneficial value, and a 1988
decision by the Department of Labor — the so-called “Avon letter” — stating that
proxy voting is a fiduciary duty, ERISA funds have been required to vote their
proxies in the best interests of beneficiaries.78 They do not seem to have suffered.
On December 14, 2002, John Bogle publicly admonished his colleagues in the
mutual fund industry and called upon them to become more active in corporate
governance, given traditional principles of trusteeship and their prominence in the
corporate equity ownership universe. “The time has long since come for funds to
cease their passivity as corporate owners and to assume the important responsibili-
ties of corporate citizenship,” he wrote in a statement appearing in the New York
Times. Careful to say that while he no longer serves as an officer or director of the
Vanguard Group, “my views reflect the principles and values that I tried to make
manifest in the creation of Vanguard…
Mutual fund directors, officers, and managers are the agents; the fund shareholders are
the principals. It is management’s responsibility to act solely on their behalf. It would
thus seem self-evident that each mutual fund shareholder has the right to know how
the shares of the corporations in his or her portfolio are voted…
When funds are required to report their votes, some business difficulties may arise.
Votes against management, for example, may make it harder for fund managers to get
information from a corporation or to win the right to advise its pension plan. Contro-
versial votes may draw unwanted publicity. Yet I am skeptical of other industry claims.
While fund managers claim disclosure would be too expensive, it would be trivial
compared to the $75 billion that shareholders paid for fund management last year.
Other managers claim it is more effective to work ‘behind the scenes’ with corporate
management. If so, let them present a record number of contacts made with manage-
ments and the issues discussed. Without these details, such statements lack credibil-
ity.79
This past July in the Wall Street Journal Bogle continued to speak out on the
need for the mutual fund industry to live up to its obligations, as laid out in the
Investment Company Act of 1940, to put the national public interest and the
interests of shareholders ahead of everyone else. The impetus for Bogle’s message
was Congressional legislation that would strengthen the independence of mutual
fund boards of directors from fund managers and require the disclosure of adminis-
trative costs to mutual fund investors. Under consideration is a bill that would
increase the number of independent fund directors to two-thirds of the board, with
an independent director as board chairman; also pending is legislation that would
require quarterly reporting on costs that shareholders incur relative to fund
expenses, as well as the cost of portfolio turnover relative to the fund’s assets. Such
measures, Bogle argued, would serve to increase investor earnings by reducing both
conflicts of interests and fund expense ratios (which reached an all-time high of
1.6% of equity fund assets in 2002).
But the larger problem, he says, is that the industry has lost its moorings.
“Originally rooted in a focus on stewardship, the fund industry has gradually come
to focus instead on salesmanship,” Bogle wrote in his WSJ commentary. “[T]he
fund industry has not adequately measured up to its statutory responsibilities of
stewardship to mutual fund investors.” He went on to propose an amendment to the
1940 Act that would establish a standard of fiduciary duty on the part of all fund
directors “to place the interests of fund shareholders ahead of the interests of fund
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managers and underwriters.” Yet in the long run, Bogle said, laws and regulations
can go only so far to restore the primacy of the public and investor interests; needed
is a “change of heart” motivated not by Congressional action but by “our own
enlightened self-interest.”80
Throughout the spring, public criticism of the labor costs involved with adminis-
tering the SEC’s new rules continued, and contributed to the SEC announcement on
April 14, 2003 that it would revisit its rules on shareholder proposals. At stake are
not just the particulars of SEC regulations governing proxy resolutions, but the
extent to which it wants to continue to devote limited regulatory resources, “acting
as referees in the shareholder proposal process,” SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins,
a Republican, said in an address last March to the Council of Institutional Investors
(“CII”).81 The Commission directed its Division of Corporation Finance to conduct
a review of “possible changes in the proxy rules and regulations and their interpre-
tations regarding procedures for the election of corporate directors,” a review
encompassing not only director elections but also an examination and consultation
process “to examine current proxy regulations and develop possible changes to
those regulations to improve corporate democracy.”82 In July, the Division submit-
ted its report, Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election
of Directors, which was released by the SEC to the general public.
When announcing the January SEC decision mandating mutual fund proxy
disclosure, outgoing SEC chairman Harvey Pitt made specific mention of the
pioneering efforts of Bob Monks and Nell Minow who, fifteen years ago, inspired a
letter to the SEC seeking fuller proxy disclosure on the part of mutual funds and
institutional investors; he also cited the letters and e-mail messages urging adoption
received from more than 7,000 investors, both individual and institution. Over
recent years, the AFL-CIO and Teamsters pension funds as well as Domini Social
Investments led the proxy disclosure campaign, which involved numerous parties
from the socially responsible investing (“SRI”) community.83
In addition to proxy voting, the SEC also has revised rules governing share-
holder reports, including the provision that mutual funds provide quarterly filings
on portfolio holdings. With regard to pension security, Congress is considering
amendments to ERISA, with an eye toward fixing “outdated federal laws” and
providing “key safeguards to protect the interests of the workers and investors.”
Meanwhile, the House and Senate have addressed the issue of mutual fund fees,
costs, and operations. The Mutual Fund Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003
is currently in the Senate. This past July, the House Financial Services Committee
approved a bill requiring greater disclosure of mutual fund fees and placing limits
on fund manager conflicts of interests; the bill now goes to the House floor.
Not to be trampled by an angry Congress, the mutual fund industry has rallied to
offset tougher legislative efforts by lobbying the SEC to adopt certain “best
practices” contained in proposed legislation.84
Not all good governance bases are covered, however, by the new or proposed
legislation. A major issue not addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley concerns executive pay
and stock options; a rule submitted in October 2002 to the SEC giving shareholders
veto power over corporate stock option plans was finally approved, even as the
SEC scrambles to put compliance standards and procedures in place.85 Meanwhile,
as stock prices have plummeted, companies continue to hand out hefty compensa-
tion and stock option packages to their executives.86 Microsoft’s mid-summer action
to drop the use of options is widely expected to have a ripple effect, though, so
time will tell.
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What began as a reform agenda pushed by a handful of dissidents 20 years ago
has evolved into widespread intergovernmental wrangling affecting the judicial,
executive, and legislative branches. The question of “good governance,” however it
is answered, ultimately relies on the machinery of our constitutional system of
representative governance, and the separation of powers envisioned by the Founding
Fathers.
In the realm of corporate power, the land of the greedy guilty and the mighty
fallen, the whirlwind of reform could very well be much ado about little. We will
need to take a wait-and-see approach regarding the implications of the Wall Street
enforcement action and the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley provisions; behav-
ioral change does not happen overnight, particularly where money and power are
concerned.
Most of the changes in the listing rules used by U.S. stock exchanges now under
consideration by the Securities and Exchange Commission will probably have a
more enduring impact on corporate reporting and accountability than the regulatory
moves, but these still are not enough to assure better markets and restoration of a
climate of trust in equity culture.
These are not enough, because the war on greed, like the war on terrorism, is
asymmetrical: all it takes is a few predators to throw things out of whack. Govern-
ment action is not the final answer. The actions of the accounting profession, Wall
Street analysts, corporate lawyers, banking institutions, business schools, and the
media deserve further scrutiny, too, and, where necessary, correction.
But these are not enough to stem the tide of wrongdoing and restore the public
trust.
We also need to consider the broader question of what it means to own property,
and how both private prosperity and the public interest can be accommodated. We
need to cultivate an ethic of capitalism tied to the values of self-governance and the
virtues of human community. We need more common sense and civic virtue so that
good fiduciary governance can take root and flourish.
We can begin to do this by capitalizing — literally and figuratively — on the
civic and ownership power we already have. How so? This article has argued for
broadening the movement for shareholder responsibility, addressing the governance
regimes of institutional investors, and strengthening their capacity to develop and
discharge responsible ownership policies. In addition to the path breaking work of
large institutional investors, some impressive movement also has been pioneered by
a handful of smaller ones, including The Boston Foundation and the New York-
based Nathan Cummings Foundation, which is described later.
More recently, the International Corporate Governance Network (“ICGN”), a
worldwide association of institutional investors that is based in London, issued a
Statement on Institutional Shareholder Responsibilities. Having already passed
through a process of public review, on May 22, 2003 the ICGN unveiled the final
text of its Statement on Shareholder Responsibilities, which was ratified by mem-
bers at the annual ICGN meeting, held July 11, 2003 in Amsterdam. The ICGN
intends to follow up its proposed shareholder responsibility coda with two other
separate documents, one on principles regarding shareholder rights, and one on
global standards for fiduciary trustee independence and competence. Continuing his
commitment to public education, Robert A.G. Monks is a member of the six-person
ICGN Committee on Shareholder Rights and Responsibilities and was instrumental
in writing the proposed outline.
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Charged with defining best practices for corporate governance, the ICGN
Statement addresses the fact that “institutional shareholders as a class have an equal
responsibility to address their own roles as fiduciaries and owners of equity on
behalf of savers.” The Statement sets out a framework of best practices on the
implementation of fiduciary responsibilities with respect to equity ownership, and
is directed to institutional investors and their agents throughout the world. It is
careful to proclaim that these responsibilities are described in general terms,
“addresses the entirety of those relations, not just the shareholder’s responsibility to
vote shares,” and cautions that they should be considered with a pragmatic eye.
“Different legal systems, different contractual relations, and different markets will
require different approaches,” the Statement reads.
It needs to be stressed that this Statement considers governance and investor responsi-
bilities associated with it not ends in themselves, but means to achievement of
optimum interests of beneficiaries. It should not be taken to encourage any form of
rote compliance with excessively detailed guidelines that might inhibit the ability to
make decisions on the merits.
It called on funds to allocate resources to corporate governance monitoring,
disclose how they exercise ownership responsibilities such as (but not restricted to)
share voting, and manage conflicts of interest to ensure that the interests of benefi-
ciaries come first. So far, the ICGN initiative represents the first time an organiza-
tion representing investors around the world has articulated performance
benchmarks on shareholder accountability. “The ICGN Board believes that this
Statement can lend strength to investor stances on the governance of companies;
gird investor confidence in the ability of funds to represent shareowner interests;
and contribute to the integrity of global capital markets,” reads the Introduction to
the Draft Statement.87 By issuing a treatise on fiduciary governance, there is little
doubt that ICGN has set an important precedent for American civic, business, and
political leaders to follow.
Closer to home here in Massachusetts, that leadership already is on display. For
the past several years, Representative J. James Marzilli has worked hard to
strengthen the fiduciary role and operation of the Pension Reserves Investment
Management (“PRIM”) Board, which oversees the Commonwealth’s retirement
system and $28 billion pension funds. Rep. Marzilli’s primary focus has been on
transparency and accountability to economically relevant social and environmental
standards. In addition to his work on legislation and government improvement, for
the past several years Rep. Marzilli has convened a working group of concerned
investors and citizens to address the question of good fiduciary governance, particu-
larly with respect to proxy voting and the integration of social and environmental
criteria. The group has been meeting regularly for several years, and includes a
number of prominent investment and intellectual practitioners (including this
author) who have offered to work pro bono with the PRIM Board and Treasurer’s
office to improve efficiencies and performance.
Although the Massachusetts pension funds deserve high marks for having
developed a detailed set of proxy voting guidelines with respect to corporate
governance, and have begun to conscientiously vote proxies, there are still a
number of challenges that lie ahead. Foremost is proxy disclosure, in keeping with
the requirements of the SEC, affecting mutual funds and investment advisers and
ERISA, affecting private company funds. Last year, the PRIM Board stated its
intent to publish its new set of proxy voting guidelines on its website. To date, this
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has not happened, although several inquiries have been made about when such
public disclosure might occur. Major stumbling blocks to fuller and more timely
disclosure include the limited number of professional staff and inadequate informa-
tion technology resources available to PRIM, not uncommon problems in these times
of heightened public scrutiny.
The chief concern is the extent to which the Massachusetts public pension funds
are fully utilizing their “wasted assets” in promoting responsible corporate gover-
nance and accountability to a range of empirical and ethical standards, especially
since shareholders stand to lose both in terms of lost earnings as well as potentially
costly penalties and fines.
For example, this past 2003 shareholder season, the PRIM Board voted on proxy
resolutions addressing social and environmental issues at approximately 150 compa-
nies. With an eye toward the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and consistency
regarding investment policy and beneficiary (and taxpayer) well being, in late June
Rep. Marzilli requested the PRIM Board to disclose its votes on these resolutions; he
had sent an earlier letter to PRIM on April 7th indicating his intent to request the
proxy voting record toward the end of June, and attached a list of the companies and
resolutions. On July 16, 2003 PRIM responded to Rep. Marzilli’s query with an
itemization of how 115 proxies submitted to portfolio companies were voted;
upcoming votes were still on the schedule for several companies, whose annual
meetings are held in the late summer and fall.
Meanwhile, in early July Rep. Marzilli expanded his proxy disclosure focus to the
nine largest Massachusetts public pension systems, asking them to report on both
their proxy voting guidelines and voting records for resolutions addressing social
and environmental as well as corporate governance issues. Letters were sent to
pension fund board chairs for the state teachers, the City of Boston, Middlesex
County, the City of Worchester, Cambridge, Plymouth County, Norfolk County,
Barnstable County, and Worcester Regional.
This past spring, Rep. Marzilli filed legislation seeking fuller disclosure of proxy
voting policies and greater transparency with regard to equity holdings. With
legislative colleagues including Rep. Byron Rushing, an ardent advocate for respon-
sible economic policies particularly on questions of human rights, Rep. Marzilli was
the lead sponsor of four bills affecting the retirement system. Two of them made it
to the public hearing stage: H.1186, “An Act Directing the State Treasurer to
Publicly Disclose Proxy Voting,” was a bill requiring the state treasurer to publicly
disclose proxy votes for companies in which the state is a shareholder; H. 1930, “An
Act Relative to Corporate Accountability,” required PRIM to consider long-term
liabilities when choosing investments, and, when appropriate, to avoid investing in
them. It also required companies to publicly report long-term liabilities and public
hazards, and authorize the creation of a new chapter of the General Laws to ensure
“sunshine in litigation” and prohibit concealment of such hazards. Both H. 1186 and
H. 1930 were heard before the Joint Public Service Committee on May 29, 2003.
The other two bills filed by Rep. Marzilli in 2003 contained specific guidelines
for proxy voting. H. 1353, “An Act Relative to State Employee Retirement Invest-
ments,” directed fiduciaries of the state employee pension fund to withhold votes
from the board of any company represented by a “non-diverse” board. H. 1354, “An
Act Directing the State Treasurer to Vote in Favor of Certain Shareholder Resolu-
tions,” required the state employee pension fund to vote in favor of shareholder
resolutions asking for reports from the management of the portfolio company.
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In addition to the testimony, on May 29, 2003, a subgroup of the Marzilli
working group met with Doug Rubin, the Commonwealth’s First Deputy Treasurer,
to talk about various reform aspects of the PRIM Board’s policies and practices.
Rubin told the group that the new administration was conducting a thorough review
of the pension operation, and had retained the services of McKinsey & Company in
doing so.  Joining Rep. Marzilli in this meeting were others who testified in support
of the legislation, including Shelley Alpern, a widely respected proxy analyst and
long time champion of corporate responsibility, fair labor, and human rights who
serves as assistant vice president and director of social research at Trillium Asset
Management Corporation, and Sanford Lewis, a gifted attorney whose practice
represents investors, nonprofits, unions, and local government on matters of
corporate accountability and environmental law. Lewis has done impressive work
and organizing on behalf of the Alliance for a Healthy Tomorrow, which is a
Massachusetts coalition dedicated to establishing new government policies to
prevent public health injury due to toxic hazards. This author participated as well,
in both the deputy treasurer meeting and the public hearings.
Why, Rep. Marzilli is asked, has he taken on the cause of responsible ownership,
of civic stewardship? “I think that most people in public life, in public office, carry
out two separate activities that are immediately linked in time,” Marzilli says,
reflecting on his role as a public steward. “In other words, we can vote for legisla-
tion affecting our tax and revenue code that generates money, which is then spent
immediately by the governing parties on their programs. Embedded in both the act
of taxation and the act of spending are some core values.
But there is a very limited understanding that in between the raising of the revenues
and the spending of the revenues is a huge period of time during which these assets
are held by public entities. There are values embedded there, too, but those values
aren’t measured. We worry about raising or lowering tax money, we worry about how
we spend it, but we don’t frequently think about how that money sits around.
The biggest manifestation of that is with the Commonwealth’s pension fund.
Massachusetts has billions of dollars sitting there, waiting to be paid out to retirees.
It’s money that comes from a mix of employee contributions and taxpayer contribu-
tions, but of course it doesn’t sit around. It is invested actively across the portfolio.
Because the investments are made in private sector entities, there is a long history of
simply ignoring what those entities do. The goal is to maximize return. Some people
misinterpret that to mean that only financial performance should be considered. I don’t
think that we have either the luxury, nor should we be so indulgent of professional
investors, that we should do that.
It has been my thinking from the very beginning that the bulk of this nation’s
private sector investments and its businesses are owned not by individuals but by the
public, but they rarely managed to benefit the public…Our dollars are being invested
with very limited regard for the public interest. Yet we’ve always had the opportunity
to vote in the public interest. So I filed this legislation….
It’s only when people know what’s happening to their lives, and to their invest-
ments, that they can take action. Short of real information, people get buffeted by
politicized messages that don’t necessarily reflect the reality of the situation.88
Good governance, wherever it exists, demands the informed consent of the
governed. But “the governed” need to know what the issues are and how to affect
them. This article has made the claim that the principles of “good governance” and
“good citizenship” should be applied to “equity ownership,” beginning with large
institutional investors whose fiduciary mission is in service to their founding
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purpose, values, and well being. Pension funds, endowments, and mutual funds are
in a strategic position to make a positive difference regarding corporate power and
accountability. Now is the time for them to develop codes and policies of fiduciary
governance that put their mouth (and fiduciary ethic) where their money is.
Power and Accountability:
Responsible Ownership, Institutional
Investors, and the Democratic Ideal
To begin to understand what we want with responsible ownership and fiduciary
governance, we need to understand the characteristics of the evolving institutional
investor world. We hear a lot about corporate and industrial misbehavior and the
culpability of boards and senior executives, but we hear little about the owners of
business enterprise, who are often equally to blame.
There are reasons for this, which are not fully addressed here. But as many
chroniclers have noted, over the past 150 years there has been a steady drift away
from direct ownership of publicly traded corporations. This is a phenomenon that,
like a low-grade fever, poses a threat to our democratic way of life because “law
and politics…serve the needs of the absentee owners at the cost of the underlying
population.”89 Economist and social analyst Thorstein Veblen was one of the first to
chronicle this trend, which he called “absentee ownership.” (Veblen also coined the
terms “business enterprise”, “conspicuous consumption,” and “leisure class.”)
Veblen’s ideas later were adopted and expanded by Adolphe Berle and Gardiner
Means.90 For the better part of the first half of the twentieth century, the idea of
“absentee ownership” meant that shareholders were property owners, but theirs was
an intangible or indirect form of ownership — a stock certificate being a far cry,
for example, from a house, a barbershop, or farm.
Decades later, this “first stage” of absentee ownership gave way to a second
stage. This one is characterized by what you might call the “ultimate absentee
owners,” the ones who own stock but hand over residual rights and responsibilities
to their agent intermediaries: the banks, the investment managers, the insurance
companies, the index funds, and so forth. The gap between “owners” and “manag-
ers” widened even more with the rise of the institutional investor class, an occur-
rence that has evolved from a marginal to a major force since the late 1980s yet has
remained primarily an invisible presence on the economic landscape.
This was the velvet revolution in property ownership, a low-key power shift
with little bloodletting. For a brief period, the flurry of activism throughout the
1980s regarding South Africa-related investments turned the spotlight on institu-
tional investors, especially college and university endowments and state and local
pension funds. This was mainly because they faced pressure from protestors who
gathered at college campuses, city halls, and state capitols to name and shame them
into action. Foundations and charitable endowments did not have to worry about
these pressures, because their primary constituents, their donors, were usually dead,
and asset management was severely separated from program concerns.
After the noisy protests died down, throughout the 1990s other commentators
and activists — most notably Bob Monks, Nell Minow, the U.K.’s Sir Adrian
Cadbury, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), TIAA-
CREF’s Peter Clapman — have lobbied for better corporate governance and
accountability, while analyzing the implications and challenges posed by the wide
and disturbing gap between corporate ownership and control. Meanwhile, other big
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public pension and labor funds began to press for change, asserting their muscle in
pursuit of improved corporate performance, while social, environmental, and
normative concerns receded.
On the accountability side, hundreds of voluntary corporate codes of conduct and
various reporting and certification procedures have multiplied over the past twenty
years, subjecting companies to greater scrutiny than ever before. The monitoring
apparatus for increased corporate transparency ranges from relatively impartial
research institutions to advocacy groups geared toward special interests. Improve-
ments in technology and more widespread use of the Internet make information
sharing on transparency and accountability more immediately accessible. A primary
challenge, though, facing corporate boards and managers is how to increase trans-
parency and accountability without subjecting firms to endless examination or
analysis paralysis.
All of this monitoring attention and activity has concentrated primarily on the
business corporation, while institutional owners have slipped off the radar screen.
The time has come to put them back on it, and resume the momentum that began
with South Africa-related concerns in the 1980s when institutional investors were
called upon to develop and exercise their moral and financial authority, yet were a
much less potent force in the capital markets than they are nowadays.
The $18 trillion institutional investor terrain comprises roughly 75,337 organiza-
tions.91 To put it mildly, there is very little sustained attention given to the emer-
gence and behavior of this group, which now controls so much of the equity market,
even if its power is relatively limited due to the intermediary role played by dozens
of investment managers and other proxies. Even worse, while there is an overabun-
dance of financial information out there, accurate descriptive information on
institutional investors is extremely hard to come by and almost always characterized
by a one- to two-year time lag. There is no central, reliable source telling us about a
fund’s type, origins, genetic traits, or behavioral and temperamental characteristics,
mainly because, unless you are in a takeover mode, there are few incentives for
gathering and disseminating it. This is probably no surprise. Information is power.
With money, you can get both — not an acceptable condition in a democratic
society.
Indeed, the public deserves a regular “census” of institutional investors that tells
us who they are, what they look like, and where they reside.  In addition to this
descriptive information, the public deserves to know about the stewardship policies
and practices governing their actions. Institutional investors are simply too powerful
to remain invisible, and too autocratic to remain truly accountable.
In our system of democratic capitalism, every shareholder has a vote, and institu-
tional investors, like political parties or caucuses, attract “voters” with respect to
their “platforms.” Consistent with fiduciary law and expectations, these platforms
should include planks on corporate governance and operations; on proxy voting
(including guidelines, forms of analysis, and periodic monitoring and review); on
board selection and continuing education (for both the investor board and portfolio
companies); on how shareholder concerns will be conveyed to portfolio companies;
on collective action with other investors; on how conflicts of interest will be handled
(affecting investor funds themselves and their fiduciary agents); on what forms of
public reporting and education will occur; on what sort of outside agents will be
retained to provide research and advisory services, or otherwise help to fulfill the
fiduciary role; and so on. Most of these positions are nowhere to be found within
fund marketing materials, prospectuses, and annual reports. They should be.
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This, too, is unacceptable in a democratic society, particularly given the height-
ened awareness of the impact of markets on all of us, including those less fortunate
or in a position to retaliate, such as regulators are now able to do. As was discussed
above, beginning in mid-2004 U.S. mutual funds will be required to submit Form
N-PX to the SEC, which contains a complete proxy voting record for each matter
relating to a portfolio company considered during the previous year; the funds will
also be required to make these proxy voting records available to shareholders,
either on websites or by mail.
Unaffected by the SEC ruling, however, are other investors, such as state and
local pension funds and charitable endowments. Some state pension funds are
beginning to consider proxy guideline and disclosure requirements. State officials
in Connecticut, Vermont, and New York announced their intention to do so last
April at the annual CERES conference.
The time has come for all institutional investors, of whatever stripe, catch up to
their private sector and mutual fund brethren. Institutional investors possess a
franchise that is simply too precious to waste; moreover, not exercising it leaves the
rest of us vulnerable to special interests and self-dealing. But disclosure is not
enough. Attention also should be paid to the range of responsible ownership
activities, beyond the ballot.
First, we need to develop a fiduciary creed, a normative theory of responsible
ownership and fiduciary governance, for evaluating the actions of institutional
investors. Disclosure means little in a vacuum. We need better models for gauging
good fiduciary governance, a process that can benefit from current work in the
realm of corporate governance and the groundbreaking work of the International
Corporate Governance Network. And we need not look too far: the enduring (but
somewhat battered) American political philosophy of constitutional civic democracy
will do quite nicely.
Second, we need high quality programs on investor education, perhaps
drawing on some of the resources unleashed by the Wall Street settlement if they
have not already been locked up by special interests. Included here are executive
programs on fiduciary governance and responsible ownership, with stronger ties to
reputable academic and research communities, which in turn need to be more
closely aligned to the needs and reality of practitioners. Good theory comes to life
in good practice, and good practice relies on good theory to remain that way.
Third, we need to recognize the power of collective networks, especially
among institutional investors with shared interests. In a significant essay on “Envi-
sioning Socially Responsible Investing: A Model for 2006,” Steve Lydenberg, one
of the most thoughtful and perceptive observers on the scene, calls for new institu-
tional investor associations sharing concerns about social and environmental issues.
“Once dialogue among these investors embraces such issues, the adoption by
corporations of formal programmes and internal policies on these issues will not be
far behind,” Lydenberg writes. He continues by pointing out the important work of
CERES (the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economics) on its Sustain-
able Governance Project, which links climate change to corporate liability and risk
exposure.
Written in 2001, Lydenberg’s article is a must-read, and identifies major initia-
tives that need to occur over the next three years within three communities: the
corporate community, with increased attention to mission, stakeholders, and
disclosure; institutional investors, with increased responsibility for voting, public
disclosure of social investment policies, and increased intra-industry dialogue on
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social and corporate governance issues; and the financial community and its
academic and advocacy group analogues, with increased attention to education,
training, and the professionalization of the socially responsible investing and
corporate social responsibility disciplines. It appears in the Autumn 2002 issue of
the Journal of Corporate Citizenship, a publication of the United Kingdom that
can be accessed at www.domini.com
Fourth, in addition to an agreed-upon theory and framework for responsible
ownership as well as fund disclosure and reporting, the public also would benefit
from a rating system that compares fiduciary governance policies and prac-
tices, and scores them according to a series of important categories covering the
level of participation, accountability, and representation. Such a framework would
review investor boards of directors; institutional charters, mission and values; who
the beneficiaries are; responsible ownership policies and practices (which include,
but are not restricted to, proxy voting); proxy voting policies and practices;
disclosure, reporting, and public education; conflicts of interest safeguards;
collective action with other investors; director qualifications and continuing
education; outsourcing of ownership responsibilities; and so on. Such a compari-
son of fiduciary governance performance could help serve as an incentive to
improved functioning, in keeping with some of the principles outlined in this
article.
Institutional Investor
Dollars and Sense: A Profile
So where does one turn to obtain baseline information on who, and what, these
investors are? Some publicly available surveys do provide credible descriptive
information; for example, the Investment Company Institute issues weekly reports
on total mutual fund assets; pension assets for the largest funds are reported in
Pensions & Investments; The Chronicle of Philanthropy publishes an annual
roundup of foundation assets; and Carolyn Brancato’s Institutional Investment
Report published by The Conference Board contain valuable summary informa-
tion.92 One has to proceed piecemeal through various sources, some of which are
terribly outdated, and often confront hefty subscription fees, to boot.
As already mentioned, altogether an estimated 75,337 institutional investors
own assets worth more than $18 trillion. Within this universe, there are about
19,000 endowments with combined asset values of approximately $951 billion.
This category of nonprofit institutions includes colleges and universities; churches;
public charities; social purpose institutions such as museums, hospitals, and
educational groups; and grantmaking institutions called foundations (there are
different classes of these, too, with different philosophies, cultures, structures, and
reporting requirements, including private independent foundations, family founda-
tions, corporate foundations, operating foundations, and community foundations).
U.S. foundations in 2000 had combined assets of $486 billion, the most recent
year for which data are available. (Not surprisingly, most foundations have
reported a drop in asset value over the past three years, prompting many to
reassess their mission, cut staff, and reduce their grantmaking.93) The assets held
by more than 600 community foundations (think of them as philanthropy’s Main
Street, much like the average person’s philanthropic mutual fund) were $31.4
billion by year-end 2001, a slight drop from the previous year’s total of $31.6
billion and the first decline in ten years.94
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Totaling some $3 trillion, state and local pension funds now devote 69.3% of
their assets to equities, up from 36.1% in 1990. This increase reflects a widespread
trend on the part of these public pension funds to diversify their portfolios into
equities from their historically more conservative investments in the bond markets.
Meanwhile, union funds (also known as Taft-Hartley funds) hold an estimated
$400 billion in assets. AFL-CIO and the Teamsters funds are among the most ardent
advocates of shareholder rights and responsibilities.
U.S. mutual funds, which by year end 2002 held more than $6.5 trillion,
amassed considerable amounts of equities over the 1990s and have become some-
what more engaged in corporate governance matters.95 In 1990 mutual funds
allocated 23 percent of their total assets to equities, which represented only 6
percent of the total equity market; by year-end 2002, mutual funds had increased
equity investments to 58.8 percent of their total assets, representing about 21
percent of the total equity market.96
Within the mutual fund category are hundreds of social responsibility funds, with
new ones being announced all the time.97 In 1999, Domini Social Investments was
the first to publicly proclaim its responsible ownership policies, including how
proxies were to be voted. As noted above, following the late January SEC ruling on
proxy disclosure, beginning in 2004 all mutual funds will be required to make such




Governance Policies and Practices
As for individual fund reporting on stewardship policies and practices, some
activist funds such as TIAA-CREF, CalPERS, and those representing union or
social investors do so, sometimes even electing board members from beneficiary
ranks.98 As already mentioned, there is no instrument for reporting on or comparing
institutional fiduciary governance policies, and little data on best practices that can
be shared with a wider audience. What exists remains anecdotal and episodic. By
and large a thick fog hovers over the institutional investor terrain, which needs to
be lifted, because you cannot get to where you want to go before you have an
accurate picture of what you are confronting.
Behind these numbers are some general patterns and themes.
First, most beneficiaries — the teachers, firemen, police, service workers, small
business owners, insurance policy holders, average person with a 401(k), a given
nonprofit organization or university or church or foundation — are several stages
removed from the decision making regarding their money, even though it is in their
name and interest that all investment decisions are being made;
Second, one could classify this “beneficiary dislocation” into three types, Type I
being the “nearest,” Type III being the “furthest” from the investment decision
maker or fiduciary. In other words, Type I beneficiaries have “in house” structures
for investing their money, such as TIAA-CREF does. They remain closely involved
with asset management, and meet directly with corporate boards and senior
executives to assure their concerns are addressed. They are active investors in the
sense that they exercise their franchise as shareholders and maintain open communi-
cation with the class of beneficiaries they represent. They also observe the delega-
tion of governance and management authority to their own boards and executives,
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as well as those of the corporations in which they hold equity stakes. In general,
TIAA-CREF is an exemplary model of responsible ownership and fiduciary
governance.
Type II beneficiaries rely upon special managers, mutual funds, or index funds
that reflect their values, placing them in customized vehicles that are designed to
harmonize with their interests such as many church and social investors do, or
Harvard University, which relies upon the Harvard Management Corporation,
which also invests the assets of other colleges, such as Wellesley.
Type III beneficiaries rely upon outside managers or funds that service multiple
clients. Type III beneficiaries are institutional investors that provide very little
direction or monitoring, other than regarding asset allocation and whether or not
financial targets are met. Type III beneficiaries are the vast majority of investors,
reflecting the tendency to delegate all financial matters to the “experts,” even
though, technically speaking, institutional investor fiduciaries — that is, a given
fund’s board — are responsible for the performance of assets, in accordance with
general assumptions about fiduciary responsibility (which are, of course, entirely
subjective and subject to constant change and modification).
To repeat: Most institutional assets held or owned by institutional investors are
actually managed by somebody else — the money managers, investment companies,
financial advisors, and the like. These intermediaries are supposed to reflect benefi-
ciary sentiments, acting in their best interest and taking direction from them. In
practice, however, it usually occurs the other way around: Fund managers pitch
their wares according to their sentiments and market niche, give direction to
beneficiaries, and are judged on the basis of financial performance alone. They
provide little or no guidance on good investor governance and vote proxies auto-
matically, usually in favor of management and with little or no critical analysis.
This is an unacceptable state of affairs.
All institutional investors, no matter what type they are, have some sort of
governance structure enabling them to formulate principles, norms, and rules, ratify
them, and monitor the extent to which performance of their financial assets follows
suit, including the opportunity to evaluate and make adjustments as needed. In
general, this is carried out by a standing board committee on finance or invest-
ments; financial reporting usually is conducted by an outside, impartial auditor, and
is contained in an annual report. In practice, investment committees rely heavily on
the advice and counsel of various parties, an organization’s chief financial officer,
accountants, legal advisors, portfolio managers, financial advisors, economists, and
the like, and often do not pay attention to many of the governance, ethical, or
social policy implications of their investments. In effect, they preside over “wasted
assets” because they have not fully exploited their power as owners.
Attention, therefore, should be paid to the “real” beneficiaries, not just their
hired guns, to their sentiments and interests, not those of their representatives who
may not pay attention, and to the structure and manner in which they order their
decision making. Each and every one of these 75,337 institutional investors repre-
sents “islands of governance,” self-contained regimes possessing rights and respon-
sibilities that determine what they do with their dough.99 Properly understood and
executed, these powers can help assure greater levels of participation,
accountability, and representation, thereby cultivating an ethic of civic stewardship.
They include the authority to make policies for allocating and investing assets,
selecting agents to help them discharge their fiduciary responsibilities, monitoring
them, developing policies for and voting proxies, obtaining the views of
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beneficiaries, engaging in dialogue with senior management of portfolio companies
(but not meddling), joining forces with other investors on matters of mutual
concern, reporting to the public, reducing conflicts of interest, continuing board
education, and so on. Like good citizenship, good fiduciary governance serves as a
vital component of a deliberative democracy and helps to assure that capital
markets work for us, not against us.
As has already been mentioned, each institutional investor represents an island of
governance, with values, responsibilities, and rights as corporate owners. They have
governance regimes that prescribe and restrain what they do with their money —
and hold a franchise to influence corporate behavior.
As a starting point, we should ask if our favorite pension or mutual fund,
charity, religious, cultural, educational, trade union, or other type of nonprofit
institution — including foundations — has a sound policy, standards, and proce-
dures for proxy voting. If they don’t, we should encourage them to develop one,
and then make sure they report on its implementation. If they do, we should ask
how it reflects their institutional values, and what mechanisms are in place to
maintain its vitality. We should find out if environmental and social risks are
addressed, as well as economic ones.
Eventually, we should examine other aspects of their own governance, to gauge
adherence to the fiduciary duty of care, loyalty, and consistency. Areas that should
be examined include investor board selection, qualifications, education and training;
delineation of board duties and priorities as opposed to those of management;
methods of assuring compliance with applicable law, including information gather-
ing and reporting; degree of board independence; outsourcing to financial / fidu-
ciary advisory and consulting firms; fees and transaction costs; procedures for
identifying and handling conflicts of interest, particularly regarding lawyers, fund
advisers, proxy managers, and money managers; board and executive compensation;
methods of evaluation  that include normative criteria; public communication and
education; overall transparency, accountability, and independence; voting guidelines
and disclosure; engagement with portfolio company management; corporate
monitoring and oversight; alliances with other investors; and working relationships
with other academic or research institutions.
There are many reasons that this is important, not the least of which is to ensure
that the values, sentiments, views, and needs of beneficiaries — call them clients or
customers, but they also are citizens who want to preserve their freedom, dignity,
and security — are at the epicenter of this decision making, and, with Types II and
III beneficiaries, that they are communicated to the money managers and other
financial intermediaries so that, in turn, corporate boards get the message, too. This
is common sense and the right thing to do. It also fulfills the truest meaning of
“fiduciary responsibility,” now expanded to include the virtues of civic stewardship.
Put another way, this means that attention should be paid to the governance
regimes that institutional investors use to communicate their responsibilities and
rights as owners to those responsible (e.g., money managers, investment advisers,
banks, insurance companies, corporate boards) for the assets they own.
It means that the same procedural values of good governance that apply to our
corporate, public, and nonprofit institutions — including transparency,
accountability, participation, and representation — should be applied to institutional
investors, as well.
It means that the franchise granted investors — one share, one vote — should be
exercised freely and fairly — and made public, an expectation affirmed by the SEC
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earlier this year in its directive to mutual funds and investment advisers. But voting
alone is not enough. Institutional investors must learn to vote wisely and well.
Fiduciary leadership, governance, power, and accountability, as yet relatively
uncharted terrain in the vast and diverse world of capital markets, economic
globalization, and corporate governance and management, represents the new
frontier of civic stewardship and responsible ownership, and demands serious and
sustained attention with the best qualities of common sense and civic virtue.
At its core, then, fiduciary governance, power, and accountability extends
democracy laterally — providing shareholders a voice, devising standards and
structures of representation and accountability, and assuring that the broader values
of republican governance and democratic civil society are embedded in ownership
norms and procedures, an idea as old as the Republic itself.
Common Sense and Civic Virtue:
Madison’s Ghost and Fiduciary Governance
James Madison is considered to be the father of the American Constitution, whose
proposed set of checks and balances relied heavily on the notion of trust and civic
virtue. His view of government was that it serves as umpire, arbitrating among
competing interests in pursuit of a just balance. He viewed direct democracy as
unjust, in part because self-interest would bias judgment and mitigate the common
good, perhaps even leading to majority tyranny. A better approach, Madison
believed, is a representative democracy, a republican government, with public
officials freed from parochial ties through term limits, periodic elections, and, save
for egregious deeds, no recall.
Madison’s idea of governance, of self-governance, was that it was a calling,
something rooted in civic virtue and an extension of fundamental principles of
integrity and honor. This was so because you needed to have officials in whom you
could trust, who also could be counted on to adjudicate multiple interests against a
standard of wise statecraft. Madison understood that human nature being what it is,
the structure of governance is not enough, however carefully thought out and
ratified; human passions have little patience for organizational charts, statutes, and
rules of order. Ultimately, the character and conduct of ordinary citizens, and the
character and conduct of their elected representatives, would determine the fate of
the fledgling nation:
I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have virtue and intelligence
to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we
are in a wretched situation. No theoretical check, no form of government, can render
us secure. To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness
without any virtue in the people is a chimerical idea. If there be sufficient virtue and
intelligence in the community, it will be exercised in the selection of these men, so that
we do not depend on their virtue, or put confidence in our rulers, but in the people
who are to choose them.
Two hundred-twenty years later, we should pay heed to Madison’s faith in the
ordinary citizen and think about whether it is justified. We also might consider its
relevance to ordinary shareholders, who have such an important role to play in
corporate governance, itself a system of checks and balances that is based upon the
republican model. This article has argued for the idea of fiduciary governance,
brought to life by the principles of common sense and civic virtue yet preserving
the vision of the American ideal.100
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Unwittingly evoking Madison’s ghost, in a conversation last summer, Boston
(and New York) lawyer cum civic leader Martin Kaplan of Hale and Dorr coined
the term “citizen shareholder” to capture the essence of this revolutionary kind of
fiduciary governance.101 Kaplan is in a position to know: A recently retired yet
longtime member of The Boston Foundation board, he was partly responsible for a
model of institutional investing unlike any other in the nation. Spearheaded by
Wainwright Bank co-founder and current TBF board member Robert A. Glassman
(who chaired the foundation board’s investment committee at the time the policy
was adopted), along with former Boston Foundation president and CEO Anna Faith
Jones and James A. Pitts, currently TBF senior vice president for administration
and finance, in 1999 the $550 million Boston Foundation developed a values-based
civic stewardship policy that emphasizes proxy voting power with the corporations
in which it holds stock.
This was three years before Enron, and long before other institutional investors
were aware of the “wasted assets” they hold.
Now in its third year of implementation, the policy is rooted in TBF’s guiding
values of access, equity, diversity, fairness, and respect. It finds expression on
proxy issues related to the environment, community well being and citizenship,
diversity and equity, and good corporate governance, and is available to the public
on the foundation’s website, www.tbf.org.  (Full disclosure: I was retained as an
advisor to The Boston Foundation’s board to help them craft and articulate this
civic stewardship policy and guidelines. The Foundation currently relies on Institu-
tional Shareholder Services to help with implementation.)
“Most community foundations would espouse a whole range of well thought out,
and certainly worthy, series of values that are embodied in their programs, but
historically they would have a kind of Chinese wall between that and their invest-
ment stewardship,” says Bob Glassman, who took over as investment committee
chair from David Rockefeller, Jr. in 1995, and was the lead player in helping The
Boston Foundation achieve discretionary authority to make its own investment
decisions (which was no mean task). Glassman is well known for successfully
integrating a deeply felt commitment to social justice into his professional and
public life; as a result, he has many lessons to impart to others wishing to embark
on a similar path. “It occurred to me that that was inconsistent…
If you asked community foundations whom they supported programmatically and how
committed they were, it would be very clear. But if you ask them if they understood
the impact they’re having on the investment side, they would give you a blank stare.
[They did not comprehend] the instrument with which shareholders impact the
corporations, which is proxy voting. Shareholders, as owners, are the corporation’s
bosses, with corporate management truly the hired hands. The goal for me at The
Boston Foundation was to have the foundation be involved and engaged.
I guess I was seeking that kind of constructive engagement at first, so that they
would take a position. It didn’t necessarily mean that it had to be my position, but it
had to be a position that the majority of the board saw as being consistent with the
values that it talked about in the annual report, the values that it espoused program-
matically, and the values that the organization would otherwise say it stood for…
  So how does one then go ahead and engage the board of directors on an issue
that for the better part of 75 years was not high on its agenda? “It took a good deal
of effort to eventually create a kind of moral symmetry between the kinds of things
we said we stood for and the actions we took through the investment portfolio,”
Glassman recalls, citing the challenge of integrating a policy affecting the federally
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mandated 5 percent payout of foundation endowment assets with the other 95
percent. “Beginning with its decision in 1985 to address the question of South
Africa-related holdings, to 1995 with the passage of the ‘Harmony Statement,’ to
1996 with the decision to divest tobacco stocks, The Boston Foundation had
attempted to fulfill its stewardship obligations in ways that advance its public
mission,” he said.102
As the foundation’s chief financial officer, Jim Pitts is charged with the responsi-
bility of making sure the policy is implemented, which includes setting up the right
systems and quality controls. A seasoned and skilled administrator with decades of
experience in corporate and nonprofit management and finance, Pitts relished the
challenge and embraced it with integrity. “From a practical point of view, I would
say that beyond the process of getting it through the board, the mechanical aspects
[of the proxy policy] were very easy,” he says, when asked to reflect on the matter.
“But that was one of my preconditions for even entertaining the idea, which was
that it had to be administratively clean and not burdensome from a staff point of
view.”
Aside from initial glitches affecting communication with Proxy Monitor (now a
part of Institutional Shareholder Services), Pitts considers the civic stewardship
policy a success, and that it has persuaded others that “nothing crazy and embarrass-
ing can happen.” A key reason, he notes, is the articulation of a guiding philosophy
and set of principles that square with The Boston Foundation’s charitable mission,
and the fact that there is considerable administrative leeway when it comes to
voting proxies. Initially, the board vehicle for this was the investment committee’s
proxy voting subcommittee; the proxy subcommittee now longer exists, he says.
One can foresee a time, however, when it may need to be revitalized.
“I guess I would say that I learned — and I hope the [foundation] board would
agree with this — that once the board agrees in concept, carrying it further in terms
of adding on a lot more issues is not difficult at all, because there’s an agreement in
principle that if we have a set of values in our articles of incorporation or annual
report, that we’re going to follow through with it in each and every way.” Pitts is
such a fervent believer in The Boston Foundation’s responsible ownership role that
he is working with other community foundations to “get on the bandwagon” and
regularly fields requests from institutional investors as to how best to do so.103
One of the nation’s oldest (it was established in 1915) and largest community
foundations, The Boston Foundation has nurtured an ethic of democratic capitalism
that recognizes the moral and economic value of the proxy vote, something that
needs to occur throughout the institutional investor galaxy. As Bob Glassman and
Jim Pitts have argued, foundations, in particular, are in a good position to bridge
the gap between programs and proxies while braiding their economic, civic, and
moral commitments into decisions about asset management, not just the 5 percent
assets they are required to pay out each year in grants and administrative
expenses.104
“We took what turned out to be a historic role in our industry,” says Glassman,
referring to the 600-plus community foundations around the country. “The Boston
Foundation has become a model for many other foundations, and I think the board
is particularly pleased that the seeds were already planted before anyone ever heard
of Enron. A number of folks are calling and asking how we can help them establish
a similar mechanism, and our proxy voting policies are now on our website.”105
What is the best way of going about this? What advice does he have for other
institutional investors? Along with Marty Kaplan, Glassman conveyed some of the
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lessons learned to a group of interested foundation folk at a meeting convened by
the New York-based Nathan Cummings Foundation on January 24, 2003. Among
Glassman’s recommendations:
•  never underestimate the importance of board education, which means
devoting a good deal of time and effort to help a board understand
the full meaning and implications of its fiduciary role. This includes
understanding that having no policy is the same as having a policy,
because fund managers generally vote to support management’s
position unless there is a directive to do otherwise. A key point is to
have a triumvirate of at least one engaged and interested board
member, working closely with the foundation’s management team
and outside expertise, not only to “change the mindset” but tailor a
plan that fits the foundation’s unique circumstances;
•  rely on quality dispassionate information and analysis, because often
there are many competing ideologies and views on foundation
boards, which can easily complicate the policy-making process.
When developing an asset management policy of civic stewardship,
foundations are well advised to begin by sticking to the values and
principles that drive their charitable mission, and then proceed to
translate them into a policy and guidelines for investing, voting
resolutions, and other actions that put their principles into practice;
•  communicate the civic stewardship policy and guidelines to others,
which not only educates the public, peers, and colleagues, but can be
a great way of encouraging prospective donors to consider the
foundation as a vehicle for leveraging their financial contributions in
more ways than one;
•  keep your eye on the larger prize. The proxy voting process, after
all, is about ‘getting out the vote,’ which is central to our democratic
tradition. Foundations are perfectly poised to address our corporate
governance crisis by helping to restore much needed trust and
accountability in capital markets.106
At a time when the robustness of their endowments has sagged, The Boston
Foundation and a handful of other foundations have forged ahead anyway, recog-
nizing that there are other means at their disposal. As mentioned, the Nathan
Cummings Foundation has played a catalytic role in helping to mobilize larger
foundations and educate them about opportunities they have as responsible owners.
In a recent article addressed to her cohorts in the foundation community, Caroline
Williams, chief financial and investment officer at the Nathan Cummings Founda-
tion, writes, “The value of your foundation’s endowments may be down, but the
actual number of your proxy votes, and therefore, your capacity to have an impact
on corporate behavior, has not diminished. It is in our own interests, financially
and, therefore, programmatically, to become knowledgeable and active in voting
proxies.”107
The impetus for Nathan Cummings’ recent efforts began, Williams says, when
Tim Smith of Walden Asset Management and the Social Investment Forum
approached them with a request to co-convene a meeting of activist foundations,
and talk about specific proxy initiatives. Along with Smith and Melissa Berman of
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Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, the meeting was held in late January 2003 to
gauge foundation attitudes toward moving forward. A decision was made to
include only larger funds, and hold off on the activist domain until there was some
sense of where participants wanted to go. And, financial rather than program staff
were invited; officials from The Boston Foundation and the Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation shared their approaches. Attendees were provided with information on
both the 2002 and 2003 proxy season, including a summary analysis of major
issues and resolution filers.
The hope, Williams says, was to generate discussion on areas of common
interest across institutional lines. Little did they know that the Securities and
Exchange Commission would generate such major and timely buzz with its
announcement on proxy voting. “It was fortuitous timing that our meeting was the
day after the SEC decision on mutual funds and investment advisers, which gets to
the question of who’s voting the proxies,” she says, referring to the highly antici-
pated ruling. “Who pays attention? The standard answer is usually the money
manager votes it, because the manager is the one who knows the company and the
stock and the management, so they’re the ones in the best position to evaluate it…
Now there’s an opportunity to ask the money manager questions, and to get yourself
up to speed in terms of what’s going on. Now you can ask your managers what
they’re doing and why, which is a great way to learn more about what’s going on,
even if you’ve never looked at the issues and you have no opinions on any of this.108
In late 2002, Lance Lindblom, the president and CEO of the Nathan Cummings
Foundation, made a similar argument. In an essay appearing in Foundation News
& Commentary entitled “We’re Owners, Not Traders,” Lindblom argued that
because foundations are major investors in corporate America, holding roughly
$400 billion in U.S. equities, they “need to recognize and exercise the responsi-
bilities of ownership. We can vote our values with our investment dollars, but the
real leverage for change is an asset that most foundations ignore — the proxy
vote. It is a right and a fiduciary obligation to vote the proxies we hold in accor-
dance with our foundations’ values. The power of the proxy can coordinate and
integrate the intellectual, financial, and programmatic resources of our foundations
to advance our missions more effectively and strategically.”109
Lindblom and Williams, like Glassman, Kaplan, and Pitts, are following in the
footsteps of others who blazed an earlier trail amidst the forest of endowments,
going back to the efforts of the late visionary and political leader Paul Ylvisaker
and others in the early 1980s, and religious investors throughout the 1970s. On the
foundation side, notable among these early pioneers is Steven Viederman, who as
president of the Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation was a staunch advocate of “mis-
sion-based investing,” which included proxy voting among a range of available
techniques. Viederman also was instrumental in organizing the Shareholder Action
Network, a device for alerting progressive investors on issues of special concern.
For many years, the Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation was the most prominent of a
handful of endowments to bridge the program and asset management divide. Since
leaving the Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation, Viederman continues to promote the
notion of civic stewardship through the Initiative for Fiduciary Responsibility,
which is aimed at helping institutional investors learn how better to align their
investment and program objectives.
“Fiduciary responsibility requires consideration of the social, environmental,
political and cultural effects of investments, both positive and negative, over the
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short- and long-term as a fundamental part of the investment process,” he writes in
“New Directions in Fiduciary Responsibility,” which appears online. “This view of
fiduciary responsibility and the obligations of fiduciaries is not a radical approach
to institutional investing.
In fact it is very conservative, making the best use of all available information that can
positively and negatively affect financial returns…It is essential to move away from
outdated views of prudence and fiduciary responsibility to a new, broader conception
that considers both long-term societal considerations and shareholder value as
mutually supportive. Transitions take time, but we must begin now.110
As already pointed out, in recent times TIAA-CREF, the New York City and
California pension funds, the AFL-CIO and other labor funds, and Domini Social
Investments also have been pacesetters. But they are not endowments, possessing a
deliberate public or charitable mission. To combat the current abuse of corporate
power and fiduciary trust, others, especially foundations and other types of endow-
ments, should take The Boston Foundation’s lead. Needed is a new kind of “voter
education project,” dedicated to “shareholder suffrage” that improves the ability of
institutional investors to do their job. The opportunity to influence corporate
governance and accountability without new laws or regulation is irresistible. All it
takes is the recognition on the part of investor governing boards that “good gover-
nance” begins at home.
Institutional investors are in a good strategic position to strengthen — through
active engagement and oversight — and broaden — through an expansion of the
meaning of “value” to ethical and normative realms — their role as owners and
their commitment to “capital appreciation” and “return on investment” to make it
more productive. As representatives of the vast number of individual investors and
donors, their franchise is a fundamental part of the principal-agency relationship
and its underlying fiduciary principle. Not exercising this franchise and not behav-
ing as responsible owners leave us vulnerable, as we have seen, to special interests
and self-dealing.
The power of responsible equity ownership and the proxy vote to give voice to
shared civic commitments that are consistent with investors’ fiduciary mission
provides a powerful nongovernmental alternative to the current crisis of corporate
governance, helps to restore trust in our capital markets, and strengthens our
republican tradition of democratic self-government.
We need to ignite a movement for responsible ownership and fiduciary gover-
nance that relies on common sense and civic virtue, and recognizes that the impact
of the capital markets and the business corporation can be influenced in construc-
tive ways through machinery that already exists.
Responsible ownership and fiduciary governance involve active trusteeship, made
possible by a public commitment to substantive principles reflected in ethics,
values, and normative standards, and procedural principles reflected in the
democratic virtues of participation, accountability, and representation.
Responsible ownership and fiduciary governance recognize that both financial
and non-financial criteria need to be incorporated into economic decision making,
because capital markets and the business corporation affect human lives as well as
the bottom line.
Responsible ownership and fiduciary governance elevate the meaning of “return
on investment” to something larger, to a future marked not just by material prosper-
ity by also by civic and environmental well being.
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Rightly understood, responsible ownership and fiduciary governance return the
principles of common sense and civic virtue to the marketplace, where they used to
reside. Put another way, responsible ownership and fiduciary governance are about
appropriating a tradition that gave rise to the birth of the American republic, a
tradition preceded in antiquity as fundamental to public life, which was that
property ownership and wealth carried with them moral responsibilities for the
common good.
These are American values, but they did not begin here, nor are they restricted
here. They are human values that, within a global context and a changing landscape
of world politics, have extraordinarily important implications. The governance
crisis facing us, and the assault on the democratic ideal that permeates modern life,
can and must be confronted, and confronted in ways that are consistent with these
values. As Mom would say, “This, too, shall pass,” but not without improving
things. Rather than sitting there passively, institutional investors should consider
themselves citizen shareholders and then get busy. They should seize the moment to
take back the power they already have, learn how to use it well, and give fresh
meaning to the idea of “wise statecraft.”z
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